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On March 24, 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) started an air
campaign by attacking targets in Serbia, including Kosovo. This thesis analyzes the
question: "What might have happened if Serbia had not retreated and NATO had had to
conduct a ground forces campaign to achieve its objectives?"
The aggregated combat model uses the situational force scoring (SFS)
methodology, introduced by RAND, to compute force ratio, attrition, and movement as
the result of combat. For a portion of the campaign analysis, the General Campaign
Analysis Model (GCAM ), developed by Systems Planning and Analysis, Inc., is used.
It is shown that a NATO ground forces campaign in Kosovo will only be
successful, if tactical and technological measures can reduce significantly the defender's
use of anti-tank (AT) weapons; even then, the casualties on the attacker's side are
relatively high. Furthermore, the developed model is a starting point for the development
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On March 24, 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) started an air campaign by attacking
targets in Serbia, including Kosovo. Afterwards it was
discovered that the overall number of 37,200 sorties had
provably destroyed only 2 6 tanks, 12 infantry fighting
vehicles (IFV) , and eight howitzer batteries. To date, the
exact cause of ,the Serbian withdrawal has not yet been
determined.
This thesis analyzes the question: "What might have
happened if Serbia had not retreated and NATO had had to
conduct a ground forces campaign to achieve its objectives?"
The evaluation satisfies two measures of effectiveness
(MOE) : minimizing friendly casualties and successfully
ending the campaign as soon as possible. Furthermore, the
created model is a starting point for the development of a
decision support tool for joint contingency planning in
higher HQ.
The data and information of this campaign analysis are
based on unclassified sources. The level of this campaign
analysis is the NATO command level for such a campaign, i.e.
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) level. Thus, this
study limits its resolution to the level of divisions for
the Blue Forces (NATO) and to the level of armies for the
Xlll
Red Forces (Serbia) ; simultaneously, the guerilla warfare
element is taken into consideration. Although such a
campaign would be a joint one, this study focuses on the
ground forces
.
A brief history of the Balkans contributes to the
reader's understanding of the conflict in this area. These
nations have suffered seven hundred years of political and
civil oppression, resulting in countless wars with
alternating coalitions. Historically, the mutual violence
could only be suppressed when strong political leadership
could form a united organization. The hatred, however, was
not eliminated—only left dormant. As soon as the "iron
clamp" ceased to exist, the violence among the Balkan
nations erupted again.
This paper's aggregated combat model uses the
situational force scoring (SFS) methodology, introduced by
RAND, to compute force ratio, attrition, and movement as the
result of combat. The SFS methodology is a force-on-force
methodology which adjusts scores dynamically by considering
the effects of the type of terrain, the type of battle, and
the combined arms imbalances—or shortages.
For a portion of the campaign analysis, the General
Campaign Analysis Model (GCAM™) , developed by Systems
Planning and Analysis, Inc., is used.
xiv
Based on a preceding study and the study of the German
Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1941, the scenario chosen for this
thesis reflects a combination of the "Macedonia Option," the
"Montenegro Option," and the "Albania Option;" i.e., the
invasion into Kosovo and southern Serbia out of the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (F. Y.R.O.M. ) , Montenegro, and
Albania.
The overall concept of operations (CONOPS) for a NATO
campaign on the Balkans, which includes ground forces, is
divided into four phases: a deployment phase (deployment of
NATO troops in assembly areas close to the ports of
embarkation) , a forward deployment phase (deployment of
these troops close to Serbia's borders), an air campaign
(air strikes in preparation of the land campaign) , and a
ground campaign (attack of NATO ground forces into Kosovo)
.
The land part of the CONOPS includes the engagement of
four divisions. Based on the availability of data and the
efficiency of the operational approach, the author has
chosen one division from each Germany (GE) , France (FR) , the
United Kingdom (UK) , and the United States of America (US)
The Serbian Army consists of three armies with eight
army corps, three task forces, and several air defense and
artillery units. Additionally, a Special Forces Corps (only
xv
in peace time under army command) and a corps-sized Belgrade
Defense HQ are available.
A key factor for warfare in the Balkans is the rugged
and mountainous terrain. It prevents mechanized forces from
displaying their high-tech based superiority and enables the
defender to withstand supposedly superior equipped enemies.
The terrain even allows the defender to use rather old
equipment effectively.
The result of this campaign analysis shows that a NATO
ground forces campaign in Kosovo will only be successful if
tactical and technological measures can reduce significantly
the defender's use of anti-tank (AT) weapons; even then, the
casualties on the attacker's side may be relatively high.
With these type of weapons, indirectly the enormous large
number of Serbian infantry troops is reflected.
Finally, with the developed spreadsheet—containing the
implementation of RAND' s SFS methodology—the basis for a





A. THE NATO AIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST SERBIA IN 1999
On March 24, 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) started an air campaign by attacking
targets in Serbia, including Kosovo. The goal was to end
the "ethnic cleansing" in Kosovo and coerce Serbian forces
to withdraw from Kosovo. More than 11 weeks later, on June
11, 1999, NATO halted its air campaign because Serbia had
agreed in a military treaty with NATO to an immediate
withdrawal of its forces from Kosovo. Within the following
weeks, NATO forces investigated roughly 90 of the engaged
targets in Kosovo. It was discovered that the overall
number of 37,200 sorties had provably destroyed only 26
tanks, 12 infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) , and eight
howitzer batteries [Ref . 1] . Furthermore, a number of
civilian targets were erroneously attacked. These civilian
casualties jeopardized NATO's credibility inside and outside
Europe and endangered the unity of the Alliance [Ref. 2] .
B . BACKGROUND
Since the end of the Cold War, especially after the
Gulf War, NATO's tendency to overestimate material and
technological effectiveness had significantly increased.
Contrary to the lessons learned from World War II, Korea,
Vietnam, the Middle Eastern Wars, and Afghanistan, the
Kosovo campaign was based solely on air power. It was
NATO's intention to conduct a clinically pure and
predictable air campaign from a safe distance. Targets
should have been destroyed with terminally-guided weapons.
Simultaneously, friendly casualties and collateral damage
would have been minimal
.
Clearly, this situation demonstrated that computer-
controlled high technology, which works well under
laboratory conditions, has limitations in a real
battlefield. Poor weather conditions, some geographical
peculiarities, and an enemy, who was tactically well
prepared, significantly reduced the effectiveness of the air
campaign. The slight influence of the air campaign on the
outcome of NATO's actions is seen, at best, only as one
factor among many that determined the outcome of the
conflict [Ref . 3]
.
Fog and low clouds caused multiple terminations of air
strikes and reduced the efficiency of electro-optical
satellite systems, infrared based reconnaissance, and the
laser/GPS based navigation of cruise missiles [Ref. 4].
Furthermore, contrary to the Gulf War terrain, the
mountainous, rugged terrain of former Yugoslavia reduced the
ability of long-range reconnaissance. From the Gulf War,
the Serbian Forces had learned that only reconnoitered
targets could be engaged. Thus, hidden tanks, IFV's,
howitzers, and "silent" radar sites could not be engaged to
a significant and desired extent. In addition, the
deployment of decoys prolonged the survival of the real,
mostly hidden, equipment.
To reduce their own casualties, which was essential for
the continuous unity of 19 democratic NATO nations, the air
campaign was limited to higher altitudes. Indeed, the 78-
day aerial bombardment did not cost the life of a single
NATO soldier or airman [Ref . 5] . Furthermore, many air
strikes were aborted during the first weeks with the honary
aim of minimizing civilian casualties [Ref. 1]
.
Derived from unclassified NATO sources, one main reason
for President Milosevic' s withdrawal was the increasing
destruction of infrastructure targets. This infrastructure
was assessed as a source of income for the Serbian
"Nomenclatura." In addition, the decreasing support of
Serbia by Russia and the increasing discussion about
contingency plans of a NATO ground campaign contributed to
the end of Serbia's aggression in Kosovo [Ref. 1]. But to
date, the exact cause of the Serbian withdrawal has not yet
been determined [Ref. 2]
.
This thesis analyzes the question: "What might have
happened if Serbia had not retreated and NATO had had to
conduct a ground forces campaign to achieve its objectives?"
C. OBJECTIVE STATEMENT
This campaign analysis will evaluate the outcome of a
NATO ground forces campaign in Kosovo—operations plan
(OPLAN) and force structure given—which is launched in
order to end ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and force Serbian
forces to withdraw from Kosovo. The evaluation will satisfy
two measures of effectiveness (MOE) : minimizing friendly
casualties and successfully ending the campaign as soon as
possible
.
The created model will also be a starting point for the
development of a decision support tool for joint contingency
planning in higher HQ
.
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This campaign analysis is based on the following
principles as far as data, level, and jointness are
concerned:
The data and information of this campaign analysis are
based on unclassified sources.
The level of this campaign analysis is the NATO command
level for such a campaign, i.e. Supreme Allied Commander
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Europe (SACEUR) level. Thus, this study will limit its
resolution to the level of divisions for the Blue Forces
(NATO) and to the level of armies for the Red Forces
(Serbia) ; simultaneously, the guerilla warfare element will
be taken into consideration.
Although such a campaign would be a joint one, this
study will focus on the ground forces. The effectiveness of
air forces will be based on the results that the NATO air
campaign from March to June 1999 has shown. Thus, this
campaign analysis assumes that the ground forces have to
achieve the given objectives with very limited air support.
During the NATO air campaign in spring 1999, five basic
options for a possible ground campaign were under discussion
[Ref. 6]: the "Macedonia Option," the "Montenegro Option,"
the "Hungary Option," the "Albania Option," and the
"Airborne Option." This study will examine the most
discussed combination of three of these [Ref. 6], namely the
"Macedonia Option," the "Montenegro Option," and the
"Albania Option."
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE BALKAN AREA
A. BEFORE WORLD WAR I
The division of the Roman Empire in the 4 th Century AD
resulted in the spheres of influence of the East and West
Roman Empire. Simultaneously, the differences between the
Greek Orthodox and the Roman Catholic Church were born.
Today, the border between both religious denominations along
the line from the Bay of Cattaro to the River Save still
exists [Ref . 7]
.
After the march through of Huns and Goths, heathen
tribes—Croats (Hrvati) and Slovenes in the 7 th Century,
Serbians (of Slavonic origin) in the 8 th Century—settled in
most parts of later Yugoslavia. The Montenegrins, of
Serbian origin, migrated to the present area in the 14 t
Century while fleeing from the Turks. The Bulgarians are of
mixed origin from Roman Thrace, Slavonia, and Turkey.
Albanians (Skipetarians) , Macedonians, and Greeks derive
their origin from tribes, which settled the Balkans—
a
Turkish word for mountains—centuries before Christ. These
include Albanians who derived from the Pelasgians,
Macedonians from the ancient Macedonians, and Greeks from
the Hellenes [Ref. 7].
The inhabitants of the Balkans were at all times
fanatical followers of their religions. Three main
religions are predominant: (1) the Croats and a fraction of
the Albanians are Roman Catholic; (2) the Serbians,
Montenegrins, Greeks, and Bulgarians are Greek Orthodox; and
(3) a fraction of the Croats, Serbians, and Albanians in the
present Bosnia area converted to Islam during the Turkish
occupation. Those Turks, who have stayed in their former
occupied areas, are still Islamic [Ref . 7]
.
In the 14 th Century the Turks started their expansion to
the North. On June 27, 13 89, the Serbian army was defeated
on the Amselfield (Kosovo Polje) . The Bulgarians were
defeated in 1393, the Hungarians at Nikopolis in 1396, the
Greeks in 1446, Serbia in 1459 (which remained occupied
until 1815) , Albania in 1462 (which remained occupied for
450 years until 1912), Bosnia in 1463, and Herzegovina in
1482 (see Figure 2.1 at the end of this chapter) [Ref 7].
Dalmatia was defeated in 1522, a Hungarian army lost the
battle at Mohacs in 152 6 (most parts of Hungary remained
occupied for 150 years) , and Montenegro was defeated in
1528. In 1529 and 1683, the Turks reached Vienna. These
and the following centuries were characterized by ever-
changing coalitions in a ferocious partisan war of the South
Slavs against the Ottoman Empire, which had its largest
8
extension in the 18 th Century (see Figure 2.2 at the end of
this chapter) [Ref 7]
.
The 19th Century brought the gradual withdrawal of the
Turks and the liberation of the Balkan nations from the
Turkish yoke. The consequences of that century-long
occupation have reached into the present. On the one hand,
the Croatian and Slovenian cultures are strongly influenced
by those of Central Europe because the Turks did not occupy
these nations. On the other hand, the Albanians have
adopted a lot of Islamic culture during their long
occupation [Ref. 7] .
In the 19 th Century, the Russians and Romanians joined
the efforts to repel the Turks from the Balkans. At that
time, the Russian-Serbian connection was established. In
1878, the Berlin Congress was conducted to establish an
order on the Balkans, but this order failed. After the loss
of the common enemy, the Turks, the centuries-old
antagonisms returned, and every nation took action against
every other. The Macedonia problem became an area of
interest for Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia. Serbia was
disappointed that Austria-Hungary was granted Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The "Dobruja question" resulted in hostilities
between Bulgaria and Romania because Romania got the
northern part of Dobruja as compensation for Bessarabia,
9
which was granted to Russia. Turkish, Greek, and Bulgarian
interests clashed in the North Aegean Sea. In October 1912,
the Balkan Treaty between Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and
Greece was signed, but no common understanding about a later
division of Macedonia could be reached [Ref . 7]
.
The First Balkan War started on October 8, 1912.
Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece fought against the
Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of London (May 30, 1913), which
restricted the Ottoman Empire in Europe at Constantinople
and the foothills of Thrace, ended that war, but an
agreement on the most controversial topics could not be
reached. Albanian rebellions against the Turks continued,
and Serbia claimed a bigger portion of Macedonia for itself
while Bulgaria was still interested in the central portion
of Macedonia. All parties rejected a Russian arbitration in
the same year [Ref. 7]
.
The Second Balkan War started on June 30, 1913.
Serbia, Montenegro, Romania, and the Ottoman Empire fought
against Bulgaria, which was heavily defeated. Due to the
Peace Treaty of Bucharest (August 13, 1913), Serbia obtained
nearly all of Macedonia and the Sanjak area while Bulgaria
obtained a small portion of Macedonia including access to
the Aegean Sea; but it had to relinquish South Dobru j a to
Romania (see Figure 2.3 at the end of this chapter) . Thus,
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on the eve before World War I, another peace treaty left
many Balkan problems once again unsolved [Ref . 9]
.
B. WORLD WAR I
During World War I, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire
fought on the side of the Central Powers, Germany and
Austria-Hungary, while Greece, Montenegro, Romania, and
Serbia joined the Entente Powers—France, Great Britain, and
Russia. Albania was the only Balkan nation which remained
neutral [Ref. 9] .
Regarding the Balkans, two profound changes in the
political situation characterized the outcome of World War
I. On the one hand, the Austrian-Hungarian Empire was
shattered. That resulted in a larger Romania and also in
the new countries of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.
On the other hand, the Kingdom of Serbia & Croatia &
Slovenia (Kingdom of SHS) was founded (see Figure 2.4 at the
end of this chapter) , consisting of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Croatia-Slavonia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and
Slovenia [Ref. 8]
.
C. BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS
When the concept of forming a state of the South Slavs
on the Balkans first appeared in 1916, Croatia and Serbia
struggled over the dominating role in this multi-racial
11
state. Because the Serbians were the majority in this new
country and Croatia fought with the defeated Central Powers
in World War I, many of Belgrade's decisions resulted in
Croatian resistance. Furthermore, Croatian' s banking,
industry, and wholesaling fell into Serbian hands. Changes
in the constitution favoring the Serbians definitely
increased the tensions. In 1928, some Croatian members of
parliament, including their leader Stjepan Radic, were
assassinated in the parliament building in Belgrade [Ref.
7] .
In 1929, the Kingdom of SHS was renamed as the Kingdom
of Yugoslavia, which included a further reorganization of
the administration in favor of the Serbians. The tensions
increased, and in 1932 the Ustasa, a terror organization
fighting for an independent Croatia, conducted a Croatian
rebellion. The rebellion was bloodily repressed [Ref. 7]
.
During a state visit in France in 1934, the Yugoslavian
king was assassinated by a Bulgarian terrorist with close
connections to the Ustasa. On January 15, 1939, the
Croatian members of parliament declared Croatia's
independence from Belgrade [Ref. 7] .
On April 7, 1939, Albania was occupied by Italy, which
soon after built up strong forces in that region. And,
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contrary to its public statements, Italy's territorial
interests soon began to focus on Greece as well [Ref . 7] .
On the eve of World War II, moderate Croatian and
Serbian politicians tried to find a balance in the areas of
political power sharing and economical equality, but the
internal unsteadiness of Yugoslavia remained. From 1918
until 1941, Yugoslavia had 39 governments, averaging a new
one every seven months. Furthermore, the Communist Party of
Yugoslavia had supported all the separatist efforts of the
Croatian Ustasa, the Macedonians, the Albanians, and the
Montenegrins, in order to benefit from these internal
tensions [Ref. 7] .
D. WORLD WAR II
After Italy had declared war on England and France in
June 1940, it attacked Greece out of Albania on October 28,
1940. But the attack failed, and Italy was repelled into
central Albania until November 1940. In December 1940,
Italy begged for German aid on the Balkans [Ref. 7]
.
In early 1941, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania joined
the Axis Powers. Yugoslavia was then virtually surrounded
by the Axis Powers and their allies. On March 25, 1941,
Yugoslavia joined that Pact as well. But, on March 2 6 and
27, 1941, a coup d'etat was conducted and the new leaders
13
canceled the two-day old agreement. Yugoslavia started its
mobilization a few days later and signed a treaty with the
Soviet Union [Ref . 7].
On April 6, 1941, Germany attacked Yugoslavia from
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, joined by a few Hungarian
and Italian units [Ref. 10] . A little more than 30
divisions, together with heavy air raids on Belgrade and the
early defeat of the Yugoslavian Air Force ended the campaign
in less than two weeks [Ref. 10] , in which Germany lost less
than 200 men [Ref. 11] . With the armistice of April 17,
1941, Yugoslavia ceased to exist. Germany, Italy, Hungary,
and Bulgaria annexed parts of the country. The remaining
territory was divided into the three states Croatia,
Montenegro, and Serbia, which were in varying degrees
subordinate to the Axis Powers [Ref. 8] .
The Independent State of Croatia was the largest among
these wartime states, headed by the Ustasa. The two other
wartime states were Serbia, under a civil administration,
and Montenegro, which was occupied by the Italians [Ref. 8]
.
Before the end of 1941, a large portion of former
Yugoslav territory became a field for guerilla operations.
The two main groups conducting this partisan warfare against
the German occupying forces were the royal Serbian Cetniks
14
and the communist Partisans under Josip Broz Tito (1892-
1980) [Ref . 8]
.
Croatian, Serbian, Muslim and Bosnian, Russian and
Bulgarian units, and also ethnic Germans from the Hungarian
Banat area [Ref. 12], fought on the German side. In 1944,
the Cetniks disbanded its units; some of them joined Germany-
while others continued fighting under Tito [Ref. 12]
.
From 1942 until the beginning of the German withdrawal
in September 1944, the partisan war increased; a
pacification of the occupied area never happened. By June
1943, Germany and its allies had increased the number of its
divisions in theater up to 12. By December 1943, this
number increased to 18 [Ref. 12] . The guerilla war reached
its peak in 1944, when Germany and its allies had more than
20 divisions in theater [Ref. 12] . In Yugoslavia, Germany
was opposed by 50,000 to 60,000 Partisans and 12,000 to
15,000 Cetniks (mobile units only); in Albania, by a total
estimated to be as many as 20,000, with the strongest group
that of the Communist leader, Enver Hoxha [Ref. 7] . On the
basis of incomplete casualty figures, it can is said with
some degree of accuracy that one out of seven soldiers in
German uniform became a casualty by the close of operations
[Ref. 7] . It is estimated that the partisan warfare in the
Balkans from 1941 to 1945 did cost all together on both
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sides about 1,750,000 million lifes [Ref . 7]. Furthermore,
approximately 820,000 homes and 90% of the railway
infrastructure were destroyed [Ref. 7]
.
World War II in the Balkans was a war of everyone
against everyone: Serbians and Croat ians fought against
Germans; Italians and Croat ians fought against Serbians;
Germans and Italians allied with Croatians and Serbians
battled Tito's Partisans; also Albanians fought against
Tito; supporting the Germans, Mihailovic-Cetniks engaged the
Partisans; veterans of the Russian Czar-army fought against
Tito; Macedonians battled Slovenians; Christians fought
Mohammedans; several Greek units fought against each other;
Cossacks and Waf fen-SS-units clashed with Partisans; and
finally English troops fought against Greeks [Ref. 7]
.
E. AFTER WORLD WAR II
By the end of World War II, Tito's Partisans had become
the dominant force in the Yugoslavian area; eventually, the
Allies recognized them [Ref. 8] . After many massacres
during the war and many post-war counter-massacres, Tito
established Yugoslavia as a federal Republic in November
1945. Once again, this compulsory calming ("iron clamp") was
based on Serbian pre-dominance, although Tito himself was of
16
Croatian origin and had fought during World War I in the
Austrian-Hungarian Army [Ref . 13] .
The new country' s boundaries were defined according to
the pre-1941 frontiers with Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and
Albania. Since Yugoslavia was a partner of the victorious
allies, some territories were added. The pre-war internal
Serbia-dominated composition was succeeded by a federation
of six equal republics and two autonomous regions (see
Figure 2.5 at the end of this chapter) . While Slovenia,
Croatia (including Slavonia) , Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Montenegro were approximately restored according to their
Austrian-Hungarian boundaries, Serbia changed substantially.
The former southern part of Serbia became the Republic of
Macedonia. In the southern region of Serbia the autonomous
region Kosovo, primarily inhabited by Albanians, came into
being while in Serbia's northern part another autonomous
region—the Vojvodina—was established [Ref. 8].
Tito's decision to grant the Kosovo and the Vojvodina a
wider autonomy in the new constitution of 1974 was
vehemently criticized by the Serbians. After the death of
Tito in 1980, the mythical nationalism, together with
religious fanaticism and centuries-old hatred arose again.
A rebellion by Kosovar-Albanians for the creation of a
republic within Yugoslavia was brutally suppressed in 1981.
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Then, in March 1989, Serbian President Milosevic canceled
Kosovo's autonomy [Ref. 13]. This caused tensions with the
other republics, which feared the increasing Serbian power
within the Yugoslav federation. The declaration of
independence by Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia in 1991 and
Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992—leaving the republics of Serbia
and Montenegro as the remainder of Yugoslavia (see Figure
2.6 at the end of this chapter)—caused a murderous civil
war, which NATO air strikes ended in 1994 [Ref. 8] .
In 1996, the tensions in Kosovo between Serbians and
Kosovar-Albanians increased again and eventually led to
another NATO air campaign in the spring of 1999 [Ref. 13]
.
F. CONCLUSION
For centuries the Balkan nations have endured
continuous bloodshed. These nations have suffered seven
hundred years of political and civil oppression, resulting
in countless wars with alternating coalitions. The
extermination of the population of entire areas, the cruel
torture of prisoners, and the systematic massacring of women
and children has become part of the Balkan culture.
Historically, the mutual violence could only be suppressed
when strong political leadership could form a united
organization. The hatred, however, was not eliminated—only
18
left dormant. As soon as the "iron clamp" ceased to exist,
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Figure 2.1. The expansion of the Ottoman Empire on the
Balkans in the 14 th - 15 th Century established its long-
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Figure 2.2. The Balkan Nations were still under the rule of
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Figure 2.3. The withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from the
Balkan Peninsula by the beginning of the 20 th Century
resulted in the First and Second Balkan War in 1912-1913
(after [Ref. 8] ) .
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Figure 2.4. World War I resulted in the foundation of
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Figure 2.5. As a result of World War II, the boundaries of
every country on the Balkans (except Albania) changed from
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Figure 2.6. In 2992, the recent tensions on the Balkans
resulted in the break-up of Yugoslavia into Slovenia
,
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina , Serbia & Montenegro, and








A. CHOICE OF TOOLS
The decision about the appropiate model for the
operational context of this campaign analysis [Ref. 14 and
15] was driven by the desired outcome, the clarity of the
documentation of available models, and the availability of
unclassified data for these models. The author has chosen a
situational force scoring methodology, developed by RAND.
The initial idea of using the General Campaign Analysis
Model (GCAM™) to implement the chosen methodology could not
be conveniently translated into action. The overall model
of this campaign analysis is implemented by using Excel
spreadsheets. As a by-product of the attempt using GCAM™,
a small model is used to give a rough time line estimation
for the deployment of the Blue Forces while simultaneously
partisan warfare against supply routes is taken under
consideration
.
B. SITUATIONAL FORCE SCORING METHODOLOGY
This paper's aggregated combat model uses the
situational force scoring (SFS) methodology, introduced by
RAND, to compute force ratio, attrition, and movement as the
result of combat [see Ref. 16] . The SFS methodology is a
27
force-on-force methodology which adjusts scores dynamically
by considering the effects of the type of terrain, the type
of battle, and the combined arms imbalances—or shortages.
Once all these factors are analyzed, the actual force scores
of both sides are obtained.
The SFS methodology describes results of engagements
among aggregated combat units. Individual combatants are
not represented in these units, rather the contribution of
the individuals are averaged together over weapon system
classes within the unit. This firepower score approach
measures the combat power of a unit by summing the combat
power values of each weapon system (number of available
assets times value of asset) in that unit. These values are
then modified by factors, which represent the influence of
terrain, the type of battle, and other such variables. The
force ratio is then calculated as the attacker's combat
power divided by the defender's combat power. This formula
gives a measure of relative combat power in the battle.
Finally, the force ratio, combined with influencial factors
like the terrain and the type of combat, is used to
determine attrition and movement of the forward edge of the
battle area (FEBA) [see Ref. 17].
The SFS methodology, developed by RAND, accounts for
situation-dependent combined arms effects in aggregate
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combat models, which is described in detail in the RAND Note
N-3423-NA [see Ref . 16]. This methodology is chosen as a
base for this campaign analysis, because, especially in the
given scenario, the value of a unit's component weapon is a
function of the special combat situation in that theater.
This special combat situation is determined by the type of
terrain, by the type of battle, and by the possible
shortages in the weapon mix. All of these factors are well
reflected in this SFS methodology.
Required data were taken from the RAND Note N-3423-NA
[see Ref. 16] and updated or completed by data found on
RAND' s web site [see Ref. 18]. In addition, the author used
military judgment to define further missing data.
The SFS methodology is a 20-step calculation process,
divided into four stages, as shown in Figure 3.1.
The four stages are:
I Varying the strength of each category of weapon as
a function of terrain and type of engagement
(steps 1 - 7)
.
II Modifying category multipliers to account for
shortages in the combined arms mix (steps 8 - 9)
.
III Calculating combat outcomes, including both sides'
losses and FEBA movement (steps 10 - 13)
.
IV Calculating casualty distributions (losses of
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weapon systems by type of system) across each
















Figure 3.1. The SFS Methodology is a calculation cycle
consisting of four stages for every time step.
To give the reader an overview regarding the concept
behind the calculation for each step, the steps are briefly
explained as follows (for a more detailed description see
[Ref . 16] )
.
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1. Number of Assets in the Forces
The calculations start with the number of assets in




• ARVs (armored reconnaissance vehicles) and IFVs
(infantry fighting vehicles)
• APCs (armored personnel carriers without anti-tank
capability)
• Anti-tank weapons
• Infantry assets (mortars under 100 mm, small arms)
;
note that the number of troops (i.e. fighting
troops) is represented by the number of small arms
• Gun artillery (self-propelled artillery, towed
artillery, and mortars 100 mm and above)
• Rocket artillery, i.e. multiple launch rocket
systems (MLRS)
• Attack helicopters
• Air defense weapons.
These weapon categories are combined into the force
ratio representing the basic ground combat assessment. To
avoid divisions by zero, asset numbers that are equal to
zero are represented by 0.00001 in the spreadsheet.
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2 . Asset Score
Basically, each type of asset is given a value relative
to the other types of assets in that category (e.g.
different values for different tanks) . Since the equipment
of a NATO division is standardized, the scores for types of
assets equal the score of the respective weapon category.
The varied weapon mix on the Serbian side is taken under
consideration by averaging the scores of asset types into
weapon category scores. In order to combine all weapon
categories into a total force score, a category weight is
applied to each weapon category (e.g. tanks)
.
3 . Raw Category Strength Points
The number of assets in each weapon category of step 1
is multiplied by the corresponding value of this category in
step 2 . The total raw strength points are obtained by
summing the strength points in each category.
4. Force Multipliers
Force multipliers are applied to take significant
qualitative factors influencing combat effectiveness into
consideration. Level of training, cohesiveness, and
nationality are among such considerations. These force
multipliers enable the author to represent the peculiarities
of the given scenario, e.g. partisan warfare. The base case
does have equal values for both sides.
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5. Base Category Strength Points
To obtain the base strength points for each weapon
category, the results of step 3 and step 4 are multiplied
for each category. The total strength equals the sum over
the strength points of all weapon categories.
6. Situational Category Multipliers
At this step, the influence of type of battle and type
of terrain are taken into consideration. RAND sources [Ref
.
16 and 18] provide look-up tables, one for the attacker and
one for the defender, where the weapon category multipliers
are listed. These situational category multipliers depend
on five types of terrain (open, mixed, rough, urban, and
mountainous) and on nine types of battle (breakthrough,
withdrawal, delay, hasty defense, deliberate defense,
prepared defense, fortified defense, stalemate, and meeting
engagement) . The peculiarities of the Balkan theater are
represented in this step by chosing values for "prepared
defense" and "mountainous terrain."
7. Situational Category Strength
The situational category strength is calculated by
multiplying the results of step 5 and step 6 in each weapon
category. Obtained is the strength contributed by each
weapon category as a function of type of terrain and type of
battle. This completes the first stage of the SFS
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methodology, followed by the calculation of combined arms
shortages
.
8. Shortage Category Multipliers
This step determines whether or not a shortage exists
in the weapon categories as a function of the combat
situation. Therefore, the multiplier associated with each
shortage, as a function of the battle situation, is
determined. These factors, representing the shortage
category multipliers, are obtained from look-up tables in
the RAND Note [Ref . 16 and 18] . This step might take into
consideration the fact that the Serbian forces lack modern
mechanized equipment and over-emphasize infantry elements,
which are far more adapted to warfare in mountainous
terrain. NATO forces, on the contrary, usually balance the
lack of infantry with high-tech equipment.
9 . Final Category Strength
The final category strength is obtained by multiplying
the results of step 7 and step 8 in each weapon category.
This concludes the second stage of the SFS methodology. The
following steps will proceed with combat assessment.
10. Force Strength
The total force strength for each side is given now by
the sum of the values of step 9. This sum will be used in
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The force ratio equals the ratio of the attacking force
strength to the defending force strength, obtained at step
10. This modified force ratio (MFR) together with the type
of battle will determine the loss-rates for both sides and
the FEBA movement rate. Due to the overall operational
situation, the factor of "surprise" is not regarded here.
12. Loss Rate, Exchange Rate, and FEBA Movement Rate
At first, the level of intensity of the attack is
determined (low, medium, and high) ; the base case starts at
the medium level. These attack-intensity parameter
multipliers are obtained from look-up tables of the RAND
Note [Ref. 16 and 18]. Then, the defender loss-rate (DLR)
,
the exchange rate (ER) , the attacker loss-rate (ALR) , and
the FEBA movement rate (FMR), and the FEBA location
—
accumulative sum of the FMR—are calculated. For details of
these calculations see [Ref. 16]; for now it is sufficient
to state that the force ratio and type of engagement
determine the DLR and ER, and through these the FMR. The
DLR is the fraction of the defending force lost in this
assessment cycle; the ALR is similarly defined. The ER is
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Final Category Strength Lost by Each Side
The loss rates of step 12 are multiplied by the total
of step 9. This result will be used to determine total
losses by category in the steps of the fourth stage of the
SFS methodology.
14 . Final Category Strength
The calculations of the casualty distribution start
with the results of step 9, the final category strength
points. These strength points will be used to determine the
fraction of strength contributed by each weapon category.
15. Category Loss Multiplier
Different types of weapons are destroyed at different
rates depending on the situation and the opponent's weapon
mix. A look-up table [see Ref. 16 and 18] is used to
determine the casualty distribution for each type of battle,
which for this operational context is defined as assault.
These loss-multipliers are obtained for each weapon category
based on the fact that on NATO' s side armor is the primary
assault weapon while it is infantry on the Serbian side.
16 . Shortage Category Multipliers
Shortage multipliers represent the casualty
distribution effect of shortages on the casualty pattern.
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The shortage factors are obtained by duplicating step 8 as
step 16.
17. Relative Category Losses
The final category strengths of step 14 are multiplied
by the category loss-multipliers of step 15. The result is
divided by the shortage category multipliers of step 16.
The resulting values in each weapon category represent the
relative loss-rates of each weapon category.
18. Normalized Category Strength Lost
The normalized category strength lost for each weapon
category is obtained by multiplying the results of step 13
by those of step 17. The results are then divided by the
sum of the values of step 17.
19. Fractional Loss
The fraction of final strength lost in each weapon
category is obtained by dividing the results of step 18 by
those of step 14
.
20. Number of Assets Lost by Each Category
Finally, the values of step 19 are multiplied with the
initial number of assets of this assessment cycle given in
step 1. The results are the number of assets lost by each
weapon category in this assessment cycle which is defined
for this campaign analysis as one day. The final strength
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of the cycle is then obtained by subtracting step 2 from
step 1, which are the starting numbers for the next cycle.
C. GENERAL CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS MODEL (GCAM™)
The General Campaign Analysis Model (GCAM™) was
developed by Systems Planning & Analysis, Inc. for N-81 for
conducting campaign analyses for the Department of Defense
(DOD)
. It provides good visualization of the simulation.
GCAM™, developed by Systems Planning and Analysis,
Inc., consists of three major components. They are
Conditional Object Oriented Meta-Language (COOML™)
,
ObjectManager™, and General Analytic Modeling Environment
(GAME™) . Models and simulations are written in a high
level modeling language, COOML™, which allows building
objects and conditional instructions for the simulations.
ObjectManager™ serves as the text editor for COOML™. It is
the working environment that runs scenarios by creating sets
of instructions in COOML™. A C++ Monte-Carlo simulation
engine, GAME™, the GCAM™ simulation engine, evaluates
COOML™ instructions [Ref . 19].
A one-week introduction course at the headquarters of
Systems Planning & Analysis, Inc. at Alexandria, VA, enables
the GCAM™ user to start working with the system.
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IV. SCENARIO, OPERATIONS PLAN, AND FORCES
A. SCENARIO
Four of the five options mentioned in Chapter I—the
"Albania Option," the "Hungary Option," the "Macedonia
Option," and the "Montenegro Option,"—which were under
discussion during the NATO air campaign in spring 1999 [Ref.
6] , had one fact in common: they planned an invasion into
Serbia, including Kosovo, from a single neighboring country
of Serbia. The fifth option, an airborne operation, was
seen as a first phase before launching one of the land
options [Ref. 6]
.
1. An Earlier Study
Preceding this analysis, the author participated in a
study of a single-entry invasion ("Hungary Option") of
Serbia [Ref. 20] . In order to determine a benchmark for the
heterogeneous- force serial acquisition model, the authors of
that study first employed a single-sector force ratio model
with Dupuy' s approach [Ref. 21 and 22] for equipment losses.
The model itself was an aggregated combat model, which
utilized heterogeneous -force kill rates and serial
acquisition; it was built with a Visual Basic macro that ran
behind a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet [Ref. 20] .
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Both the Dupuy single-sector force ratio model and the
heterogeneous -force serial acquisition model provided
similar estimates for the length of time and number of
losses to complete the first campaign phase (seizing rivers
Sava and Danube beside Belgrade) of an Allied attack into
Serbia out of Hungary. The two attacking NATO divisions
reached the objective for the examined phase in less than a
week, but the number of NATO's losses was relatively high
(for details see [Ref . 20]).
The overall conclusion was the recommendation for a
different strategic approach: relating to the results of the
actions in World War II, NATO would be recommended to open
up a second and even third front by attacking out of other
Serbia's neighboring countries. That might force Serbia to
split up its forces and thus reduce friendly casualties.
2. Study of the German Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1941
In World II, on 6 April 1941, Germany launched its
attack into Yugoslavia with 33 divisions from Bulgarian,
Hungarian, and Romanian territory (see Figure 4.1 next
page.) Supported by heavy air raids on Belgrade, this was a
new display of "Blitzkrieg" [Ref. 10] . At a very early
stage of that campaign, the Yugoslavian Air Force was
defeated—before it could come to the nation's defense [Ref.
11] -
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The German plan called for an incursion from Bulgaria
by the 12 th Army, which would aim southward to prevent
possible Greek assistance to the Yugoslavs. Two days later,
the 1 st Panzer Group would lead north toward Nis and
Belgrade, where it would be joined by the 2 nd Army and other
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Figure 4.1. In April 1941, Yugoslavia was defeated by a
German attack in less than two weeks (after [Ref. 10]).
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The plan worked smoothly, and there was little
resistance to any of these attacks, launched between April 6
and 17. On April 17, an armistice was signed [Ref . 11]
.
Germany lost only 151 men in the entire 11 -day campaign
due to its superior equipment and the strategic approach
[Ref. 11] . Additionally, internal dissension among the
various Yugoslavian states aided Germany. Another factor in
Germany' s favor was the defender' s use of an ineffectual
cordon deployment that was no match for the strength and
numbers engaged against them. Finally, Germany's air
superiority, including the early defeat of the Yugoslavian
Air Force, completed the case [Ref. 11]
.
3 . The Scenario
The scenario of this campaign analysis is based on the
above mentioned results of the preceding study, the
evaluation of military history, and the fact that in Spring
1999 the most discussed ground forces campaign scenario (in
open sources) was that of a combination of at least two
options [Ref. 6] . Thus, the scenario chosen for this thesis
reflects the combination of the "Macedonia Option," the
"Montenegro Option," and the "Albania Option;" i.e., the
invasion into Kosovo and southern Serbia out of the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (F.Y.R.O.M., in the following
called Macedonia), Montenegro, and Albania.
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The chosen scenario does include a principle build-up
phase of NATO forces in Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro
for two reasons. First, unlike the build-up phase for
"Desert Shield" and "Desert Storm" (Gulf War 1990-1991) the
training of the forces scheduled to go into action will be
conducted in the respected home countries due to political
and organizational reasons [Ref . 23] . The deployment then
will serve a pre-determined political escalation which
enhances the deterrence by creating increasing political
pressure on Serbia. Secondly, the following political
assumptions assume that this phase will already have some
combat elements—represented by partisan actions of Serbian
elements in Montenegro.
Albania and Macedonia provided their territory as a
starting base for the KFOR (Kosovo Force) operation, which
followed immediately after NATO's air strikes in June 1999
[Ref. 24] . Thus, a partisan warfare threat on their
territories is not assumed.
NATO-member Greece, though in opposition to the NATO
engagement in that region due to an old conflict with
Macedonia, has been supporting the KFOR as well [Ref. 24] .
Thus, no actions against NATO troops on Greek territory is
included.
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Since the break-up of the former Yugoslavia in 1992,
the Republic of Montenegro has been under the rule of the
Republic of Serbia in the remainder of Yugoslavia. Due to
the Serbian pre -dominance, tensions have steadily increased.
In preparation for the defense against NATO's air campaign,
many Montenegrin reservists did not follow their
conscription into the Serbian forces [Ref . 25] .
Additionally, the number of armed incidents between
Montenegrin police forces and regular Serbian forces had
significantly increased since 1998 [Ref. 26]. Repeatedly,
NATO had to calm the Montenegrin government to prevent a
public plebiscite about a secession from Serbia [Ref. 25] .
Recently, rumors have occurred that a new constitution has
been prepared in Belgrade, because the present constitution
theoretically allows Montenegro to secede from Serbia after
a positive public plebiscite [Ref. 27]. Many analysts
assume that Montenegro would secede before a NATO land
campaign, so that they would not end up on the defeated side
and, furthermore, so that they could fulfill their
independence aspirations [Ref. 25]
.
Thus, the author has added the "Montenegro Option" to
the "Albania Option" and the "Macedonia Option."
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B. THE TERRAIN
In general, the southern part of former Yugoslavia is a
mountainous region with a varied appearance. Densely
wooded, undulating, and mountainous terrain in the North
changes to treeless, arid, and to karst developed chalky
plateaus in the South. Some massifs even gain alpine
elevations [Ref . 28] . The topography is as follows: arable
land 36%, woodlands 29%, pasture land 21%, and other 14%
[Ref. 28]
.
In 1991, Kosovo had a population of 1.96 million people
[Ref. 28]. Its 10,887 km2 made up 10.7% of the territory of
the former Yugoslavia [Ref. 28] .
The northwestern area of Kosovo is characterized by the
two wide basins of Kosovo Polje (500 km2 ) and Metohija (600
km2 ) on 500 m (NN) and the to karst developed mountain range
on 500 - 1400 m (NN) in between (see Figure 4.2 at the end
of this chapter) . Only three other basins occupy the small
open terrain: in the northeast, Little Kosovo (80 km2 ); in
the east, the Gnjilane Basin (400 km2 ) ; and in the center,
the Drenica Basin (1,200 km2 ) [Ref. 29]. The Kosovo area is
surrounded by chalky massifs which reach an elevation of
more than 2,50 m (NN) : Kopaonik in the North, Crna Gora in
the Southeast, Sar Planina in the South, and the Albanian
Alps in the West [Ref. 28] . These ridges of mountains are
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punctuated only by a very limited number of passes and
rivers, through which access into Kosovo on roads is
possible (see Figure 4.2 at the end of this chapter)
.
Kosovo has some 1,500 settlements. Fifty percent of
the population lives in small settlements (up to 10,000
people). The larger cities are Pristina (above 100,000),
Prizren (70,000), Pec (60,000), Kosovska Mitrovica (58,000),
Djakovica (46,000,), and Gnjilane (40,000) [Ref. 29].
The road network in the southern part of former
Yugoslavia is only moderately developed. The main roads are
asphalt roads, while many minor and mountain roads are
gravel roads only. Due to snowdrifts, many mountain passes
and high-altitude roads are closed to traffic during winter
time. The two main southward routes Belgrade-Nis-
Skopje (Macedonia) -Thessaloniki (Greece) and Belgrade-
Podgorica (Montenegro) -Kotor (Montenegro) do not lead through
Kosovo (see Figure 4.2 at the end of this chapter)
.
The rail network in the same area is also not well
developed. In 1997, only the two main railways southwards,
Belgrade-Nis-Skopje (Macedonia) -Thessaloniki (Greece) and
Belgrade- Priboj -Podgorica (Montenegro) -Bar (Montenegro) , were
electrified [Ref. 28]. But, all minor railways have been
switched over to the European rail standard gauge, like the
main railways. The terrain limits the capacities of the
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routes (see Figure 4.2 at the end of this chapter) . For
example, the main railway Belgrade-Bar (Montenegro) is a 476-
km single-track railway with 234 bridges; 24% (114 km) of
its length consists of tunnels [Ref. 28].
C. OPERATIONS PLAN
The chosen overall concept of operations (CONOPS) for a
NATO campaign on the Balkans, which includes ground forces,
is divided into four phases [Ref. 6] : a deployment phase
(deployment of NATO troops in assembly areas close to the
ports of embarkation) , a forward deployment phase
(deployment of these troops close to Serbia's borders), an
air campaign (air strikes in preparation of the land
campaign) , and a ground campaign (attack of NATO ground
forces into Kosovo)
.
An air campaign in preparation for a ground forces
campaign is limited to tactical targets in southern Serbia
and Kosovo. Destroyed infrastructure would slow advancing
NATO forces and, thus, increase casualties.
The CONOPS includes the engagement of four divisions.
Based on the availability of data and the efficiency of the
operational approach, the author has chosen one division
from each, Germany (GE)
, France (FR) , the United Kingdom
(UK) , and the United States of America (US) . The basic idea
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of the operations plan (OPLAN) for each division is as
follows (see Figure 4.3 at the end of this chapter)
.
The US division is assigned to Montenegro. From the
assembly area (AA) around the port of embarkation (POE) Bar
(Montenegro) , the forward assembly area (FAA) in eastern
Montenegro is reached evenly by railway and road. For the
ground campaign, the US division is tasked to seize the
northwest area of Kosovo (80 km advance distance) and
simultaneously to be prepared to secure NATO' s left flank
against possible Serbian attacks from the north.
The POE for the FR division is Durres (Albania) . From
that AA the FAA in northeast Albania is reached by railway,
but mostly by road. Within the attack framework, the FR
division is to seize the southwest area of Kosovo (30 km
advance distance) .
Due to the large capacity of the NATO harbor
Thessaloniki (Greece) , both the UK division and the GE
division have it as a common POE. The UK division's AA is
located west of this POE from where the FAA in northwest
Macedonia is reached by railway. The UK division is then
tasked to attack north and seize the southeast area of
Kosovo (50 km advance distance)
.
The GE division has its AA north of the Greek POE. The
FAA in northeast Macedonia is reached mostly by railway.
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For the ground campaign, the GE division is tasked to seize
the northeast area of Kosovo (80 km advance distance) while
simultaneously being prepared to secure NATO's right flank
against possible Serbian attacks from the north and
northeast
.
In compliance with NATO' s concept of pre-determined
escalation [Ref. 30], every phase of the CONOPS is intended
to increase the political and military pressure on Serbia in
order to maintain the possibility of reaching the overall
goal without the use of military force. In analogy to the
actions in Spring 1999, the air campaign and ground forces
campaign will be launched only with the consent of all 19
NATO members. For this study, that consent is assumed, as
well as the fact that the deployed NATO forces are fully
equipped and adequately trained—like for "Desert Storm"
(Gulf War 1990-1991) [Ref. 23]—before the attack is
launched.
D. BLUE FORCES (NATO)
This campaign analysis is conducted on the same NATO
command level as the actions in spring 1999: the Supreme
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) level. Thus, the
resolution for the Blue Forces (NATO) is the level of
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divisions and that for the Orange Forces (Serbia) is the
army level
.
The maneuver element provided by France is the 2 nd (FR)
Armored Division, which is divided into two armored
regiments, three mechanized infantry regiments, a
reconnaissance squadron, an armored anti-tank squadron, and
a self-propelled artillery regiment [Ref . 31 and 32] . For
details see Annex A.
Germany goes into theater with its 7 th (GE) Armored
Division, with one armored brigade, two mechanized infantry
brigades, a self-propelled artillery regiment, an army air
defense regiment, and a reconnaissance battalion as its
assets [Ref. 33 and 34] . For details see Annex A.
The United Kingdom provides the 1 st (UK) Armored
Division, with three armored brigades, a division artillery
group (consisting of artillery and air defense assets) , an
armored reconnaissance regiment, and an aviation regiment
[Ref. 35 and 36] . For details see Annex A.
The United States of America provide their 1 st (US)
Infantry Division (Mech) , which consists of three mechanized
brigades, one aviation brigade, a division artillery
element, and an air defense battalion [Ref. 37 and 38] . For
details see Annex A.
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E. ORANGE FORCES (SERBIA)
The Serbian Army consists of three armies with eight
army corps, three task forces, and several air defense and
artillery units. Additionally, a Special Forces Corps (only
in peace time under army command) and a corps-sized Belgrade
Defense HQ is available (see ANNEX B) [Ref . 39] .
The inventory data for Serbia's equipment (see ANNEX B)
show that only a small fraction of forces consist of modern
equipment [Ref. 40, 41, and 42] . This will be taken under
consideration with the respective weapon scores in the
model; the old T-34 tanks in Serbian depots are not included
(see Annex B) because the probability of its engagement is
quite low due to the lack of trained personnel and the lack
of spare parts.
The terrain with its mountainous, rugged, and
channeling character allows ambushing and in general close-
range fighting. On these close ranges, old weapons are
effective and therefore a threat even to modern mechanized
weapon systems, especially, if employed in an enemy's flank
or back. Thus, the old recoilless rifles are included (see
Annex B)
.
There is an enormous difference in the number of
peacetime and wartime troops in the Serbian forces [Ref.
39]. On NATO's side, only fighting troops are counted. The
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respective number on the Serbian side is high because it is
realistic and prudent to assume that Serbia will use the
NATO build-up and deployment phases for a mobilization as
extensively as possible. Furthermore, the security,
paramilitary, and police forces, which are not part of the
regular army forces [Ref. 39]—but have almost the same
strength as the entire regular Army—are reflected in those
high numbers. The actual numbers of fighting troops is
derived by using the relation of 1:16 for fighting
troops : strength (i.e. for every fighting soldiers, 16
soldiers are needed for combat support, logistics etc.);
this relation is with up to 1:20 even higher for NATO forces
[Ref. 15]
.
The three Serbian army corps are located as follows
[Ref. 39] : 1 st (SER) Army is located in the area north of
Sava-Belgrade-Danube, 2 nd (SER) Army in southwest Serbia and
Montenegro, and the 3 rd (SER) Army in southeast Serbia. It
is assumed that during NATO' s preparation phases the 2n
(SER) Army will leave Montenegro—leaving some elements
behind which might conduct ambushing on NATO supply routes
—
and, together with the 3 rd (SER) Army, will prepare for
defense in mountainous Kosovo and southern Serbia. A NATO
surprise attack can be excluded since the requested time and
the extent of the preparations do not allow a deception of
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the Orange Forces about the strategic approach. The 1 st
(SER) Army is expected to be available as a strategic
reserve in the area around Belgrade while simultaneously
providing a minimal protection force at Serbia's border to
Croatia.
F. OPPOSING FORCES
Based on the preceding operational facts, the approach
for the opposing ground forces is as follows: the US and the
FR division will have to cope with the 2 nd (SER) Army in
western Kosovo. For the model it is assumed that both the
US and the FR division will have to deal each with half of
the strength of the 2 nd (SER) Army. The GE and the UK
division will have to deal with the 3 rd (SER) Army in
eastern Kosovo. In this area, it is also assumed that both
the GE and the UK division will face half of the 3 rd (SER)
Army asset inventory number.
Although the US division and the GE division have to
prepare contigency plans for securing NATO's northern flank,
it is not assumed that the 1 st (SER) Army will be employed
southward. Its engagement against NATO forces is excluded
as long as NATO does not proceed north for Belgrade, the
core area for the present regime
.
53
The asset numbers for the opposing forces, as well as
the values for weapon category scores, force multipliers,
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Figure 4.2. Traffic development in southern Serbia, Kosovo,
and Montenegro is very limited due to the extensively







Figure 4.3. The NATO concept of operations is based on four
divisions , one each provided by France, Germany, the United
Kingdom, and the United States of America.
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V. RESULTS, ANALYSIS, AND CONCLUSIONS
A. THE GCAM™ MODEL
The GCAM™ simulation was used for analyzing the
deployment phase and the forward deployment phase. It shows
that the force build-up of the four NATO divisions in the
assembly areas (AA) around the ports of embarkation (POE)
can be completed' within three weeks. This does not include
a preceding preparation of the harbors with its unloading
facilities. Furthermore, the forward deployment from the AA
into forward assembly areas (FAA) close to Kosovo's borders
is possible within one week. This again does not include
any preparation of the infrastructure. Since the four
divisions conduct this forward deployment with different
transport means, a coordination time frame of at least five
days would be necessary to enable NATO to launch its ground
attack into Kosovo coordinatedly with all available forces
as soon as the FAA are reached.
Due to the assumed political and military situation,
the simulation underlines that the US division has to be
prepared to defend its deployment and supply routes against
ambush actions. The recommendation for the decision maker
would be to deploy security forces along these routes which
are not part of the attacking units.
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Although this simulation includes only the prelude
phase for the ground forces campaign (no real firefights
between larger units yet) , the coding was extensive (see
Annex D) . It has turned out that the use of GCAM™ for an
initial military decision—usually as a reaction to an
uprising crisis under time and political pressure—is too
time consuming. GCAM™ is better used when fundamental
decisions have been made and more detailed answers are
needed for further specific planning purposes.
B. THE RAND SFS MODEL
The results of this campaign analysis' base case are
discouraging. No NATO division comes close to its objective
because the inventory number of infantry assets—which
include troops—fade down to zero much earlier. This is not
acceptable, even under the rule of thumb that among
casualties the relation between the dead and wounded is 1:3
[Ref . 15] . The GE division reaches a stalemate (i.e. has to
change into hasty defense) after 24 km on day 5, the UK
division after 16 km on day 4, the US division after 33 km
on day 5, and the FR division after 8 km on day 3 (see
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Figure 5.1. The base case shows that if Serbia has all AT
assets available and uses them effectively, the NATO
divisions wouldn't seize their objectives
.
The fact that this outcome is driven by the weapon
category "infantry assets"—for which Serbia has high
numbers and which reflect the inclusion of the security,
paramilitary, and police forces—suggests that a significant
increase of the infantry asset numbers in the four NATO
divisions would change the result. But this is not the
59

case. Even the tripling of the infantry assets still
results in unsatisfactoring outcomes. The GE division then
has to abort the attack after 28 km on day 5, the UK
division after 21 km on day 5, the US division after 43 km
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Figure 5.2. Even with tripled infantry assets, the NATO




The next step of the analysis is a closer look at the
scores and multipliers of calculation steps 1 to 9 of the
SFS methodology. Given that the values for asset scores,
situational category multipliers, and shortage category
multipliers—obtained from RAND sources [Ref. 16 and 18]—
are realistic, a consideration about the force multipliers
must be made. The force multipliers mainly reflect the
level of training, cohesiveness, and nationality [Ref. 16]
of a unit. Since the scenario is an invasion—after a
sufficient training phase for both attacker and defender—it
is not realistic to assume that the values of the force
multipliers on the NATO side would be higher than on
Serbia's side. Rather, these values might be higher for
Serbian units which—motivated by a lasting propaganda that
refers cleverly to historic events—defend its own
territory. Furthermore, examples from recent military
history (e.g., the Falklands War in 1982, the Gulf War in
1991) indicate that there are, within one nation's forces,
different categories of training, cohesiveness, and
motivation already on battalion level. Since the resolution
of this campaign analysis is division or army level, no
significant difference between NATO' s and Serbia' s force
multipliers is feasible. The author applied a difference of
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50% (i.e. force multiplier NATO equals 1.0, that of Serbia
equals 1.5) with no significant influence on the outcome.
Finally, it turns out that the number of anti-tank (AT)
assets is the key element for the defender. In conjunction
with its situational category multiplier (approximately
three times higher for the defender due to the terrain and
the type of battle) , this number is more than 10 times
higher on Serbia's side than on the NATO side. The author
would like to remind the reader that the enormous number of
Serbia's AT assets results from recoilless rifles.
An analysis without the inclusion of Serbia's
recoilless rifles results in a successful NATO ground forces
campaign, as shown in Figure 5.3 below. The GE, UK, and US
division seize their objectives in less than a week;
parallel, the FR division ends up close to its objective
before the casualties increase exponentially.
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Figure 5.3. The success of the NATO ground forces campaign
depends on Serbia's access to AT weapons.
Still unsatisfatory, though, are the high numbers of
lethal casualties for NATO. The GE division counts 1194
casualties in the category "infantry assets", which by the
above mentioned rule of thumb of 1:3 [Ref. 15] are 298
lethal casualties. These are 20.7% of the infantry asset
strength and
—
given that Germany, like the three other
nations, is in theater with 20,000 troops—1.5% of the
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overall strength. The UK division has 1003 infantry asset
casualties, resulting in 250 lethal casualties which are
20.4% of the infantry asset strength and 1.3% of the overall
British strength. The US division suffers 432 casualties,
i.e. 108 lethal casualties. Thus, these US losses are 14.9%
of the infantry asset strength and 0.6% of the overall
strength. Finally, the FR division has 829 casulties
resulting in 207 lethal ones. These are 21.0% of infantry
asset strength and 1% of all FR troops in theater. The
overview of NATO's casualties which add up to 3,458—from
which 863 are lethal—is shown in Table 5.4 below.
Days km C asualties Lethal Leth. Cas. in % Leth. Cas. in
Tof max. kml Casualties of Inf. Assets % of Strenqth
GE 6 78 [80] 1194 298 20.69% 1 .49%
UK 5 47 [50] 1003 250 20.42% 1 .25%
US 5 84 [80] 432 108 14.88% 0.54%
FR 4 25 [30] 829 207 21.02% 1 .04%
Table 5.4. The casualties on NATO's side are relatively
high even in the case where the NATO divisions seize their
objectives .
Thus, the first MOE—minimizing friendly casualties—is
not fulfilled while the second one—successfully ending the
campaign as soon as possible—is fulfilled.
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It is now up to the military decision leader to draw
conclusions and make recommendations for the political
level. On the one hand, due to the time line of the
preparation phase, serviceability of older equipment and the
availability of the respective well-trained personnel cannot
be neglected. On the other hand, due to its technological
superiority, NATO can foresee effective counter-measurements
in its operations plan—e.g., reinforcement of artillery and
mortar components—to minimize the effectiveness of these
types of weapons. Additionally, to further reduce the
number of casualties, other NATO nations might be requested
to reinforce the four divisions with infantry-heavy units.
The tactical approach of the attack might also be
adjusted. The faster the attack can be advanced, the less
effectively can these old AT weapons—which need close-range
and only slow moving targets—engage mechanized forces.
Thus, a strong engineer support element for the attacking
units must be as close to the spearheads as possible. In
addition, air reconnaissance must focus on barriers in the
depth of the battle field—heavily favored by the
mountainous and channeling terrain, which simultaneously
suppresses outflanking and the support for and from
neighboring units—as early as possible. Airborne breaching
forces can further ensure that the attack does not slow
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down. Furthermore, airborne troops (e.g. 82 nd (US) Airborne
Division, 101 st (US) Air Assault Division) are able to seize
and secure key infrastructural targets—like bridges or
tunnels—to guarantee the guick advance of the attacking
forces
.
Close air support (CAS) and the availability of attack
helicopters can secure the flanks of advancing troops.
Additionally, aerial strike forces have to engage all
southward advancing units of the 1 st (SER) Army to prevent
them from further changing the force ratio to the
disadvantage of NATO.
A clearly structured spreadsheet containing the SFS
methodology could be created in a reasonable amount of time.
The advantage is the fact that the numbers and values can be
changed without the need to create a new code. Thus, a
sensitivity analysis starting from a base case can be done
easily with this created tool.
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VI. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER WORK
This campaign analysis wanted to evaluate the outcome
of a NATO ground forces campaign in Kosovo—launched in
order to end ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and to coerce
Serbian forces to withdraw from Kosovo. Based on
unclassified data, the level for this campaign analysis was
that of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) . Thus,
the resolution level on NATO' s side was the division level
and that on Serbia's side the level of armies.
Simultaneously, a guerilla warfare element was integrated.
This campaign analysis focused on ground forces, so air
support was not added.
Besides the tactical results, the developed model
should serve as a starting point for the development of a
decision support tool for joint contingency planning on the
division level and higher.
For the model, the situational force scoring (SFS)
methodology, developed by RAND, was chosen. The decision
was driven by the fact that the documentation for this
methodology is clearly structured. Furthermore, the
respective data for the equipment used in this scenario was
available in the documentation and could be completed by
updates on RAND' s web site. A possible further study might
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compare this analysis' results with those gained by using
the methodology and sources of the Dupuy Institute.
The original idea of implementing the chosen
methodology in GCAM™ was feasible at the time of the
decision. During the process, though, it has turned out,
that GCAM™ is better suitable for a longer and more
detailed analysis process. Nevertheless, to indicate its
capability, GCAM™ was used to determine constraints for the
pre-war phases considering partisan warfare among other
factors. Eventually, the core of the campaign analysis was
supported by a spreadsheet containing the model with the
implementd SFS methodology.
The operational scenario for this campaign analysis was
based on the results of a proceding study and the study of
the Balkan's military history in World War II. Recently
published sources [Ref. 43] underline the realism of the
chosen scenario.
A key factor for warfare on the Balkans is the terrain.
It prevents mechanized forces from displaying its high-tech
based superiority and enables the defender to withstand
supposedly superior equipped enemies. It even allows the
defender to use rather old equipment effectively.
Although the operational approach successfully divides
Serbia's forces, a NATO ground forces campaign in Kosovo
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will only be successful, if tactical and technological
measures can reduce significantly the defender' s use of AT
weapons. Even then, the casualties on the attacker's side
are relatively high and can only be further decreased by a
massive use of high-tech army equipment, e.g. helo support,
artillery and drones. But the mountainous and channeling
terrain limits the number of units and weapon systems that
can simultaneously engage the enemy. Additionally, the
effectiveness of close air support (CAS) is also limited by
the terrain and depends highly on the weather conditions.
With the developed spreadsheet—containing the
implementation of RAND' s SFS methodology—the basis for a
decision support tool for joint contingency planning has
been made. It enables a higher headquarters (HQ) to obtain
a quick response on an uprising crisis. With this kind of
campaign analysis under time pressure, a disaster later in
the field due to the deployment of mismatching forces can be
avoided. For later reinforcements of these forces, more
detailed and time-intensive models—like GCAM™—might be
applied.
The author suggests further work to be done in three
areas. One the one hand, the existing model needs to be
refined as far as scores and modifiers are concerned. On
the other hand, the respective tools for an air campaign and
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a navy campaign must be added to reach the goal of building
a tool for joint decision purposes. And finally, it would
be helpful for both the briefing analyst and the decision
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ANNEX A: BLUE FORCES (NATO)











2nd (FR) Armored Division 174 7J 2§ 42 985 42 24 18
Armd Regt 70 8
Armd Regt 70 8
Mech Inf Regt 17 38 14 8 6
Mech Inf Regt 17 38 14 8 6
Mech Inf Regt (wheeled) 52 8 6
Recce Sqn 6
Armd Anti-tank Sqn 12
SP Arty Regt 24
GERMANY:
7. (GE) Partzerdivision 318 390 24 54 1440 156 24 11
PzGrenBrig 19 106 118 12 18 44
PzBrig 21 106 118 18 44





1 (UK) Armored Division 300 306 240 24 1224 120 11 24
4 Armored Brigade 100 90 80 8 32
7 Armored Brigade 100 90 80 8 32
20 Armored Bngade 100 90 80 8 32
DAG 24 18









1st (US) Infantry Division (Mech)
1st Bngade
1st Bn/16th InfReg
1st Bn/34th Armor Reg




1st Bn/77th Armor Reg
3rd Bngade
2nd Bn/2nd InfReg
1st Bn/63rd Armor Reg
2nd Bn/63rd Armor Reg
4th Bngade
1st Bn/1st Aviation Reg
2nd Bn/1 st Aviation Reg
1st Sqn/4th Cavalry Reg
Division Artillery
1st Bn/5th FA Reg
1stBn/7thFAReg
1st Bn/6th FA Reg
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ANNEX B: ORANGE FORCES (SERBIA)
Equipment (in analogy to the types of assets required for the SFS methodology, see Chapter III.A. 11:
Unit: Location
Serbian Army (3 armies w/ 8 armv corps + Belgrade Def HQ)
1st (SER) Army Belgrade
Mechanized Corps Belgrade
252nd Armored Bngade Kralievo
1st Mechanized Bngade Belgrade
2nd Mechanized Bngade Valievo
3rd Mechanized Bngade Pozarevac
35th Motonsed Bngade Mladenovac
1 st Mixed Artillery Bngade Kraguievac
Novi Sad Corps Novi Sad
36th Mechanized Bngade Subotica
453rd Mechanized Bngade Sremska Mitrovica
12th Mechanized Bngade Sombor
1 8th Motonsed Bngade Novi Sad
127th Light Infantry Bngade Novi Sad
16th Mixed Artillery Bngade Ruma
16th Mixed Anti-Tank Artillery Bngade Backa Topola
Belgrade Defense HQ Belgrade
151st Motonsed Bngade Belgrade
505th Motonsed Bngade Belgrade
153rd Light Motonsed Bngade Obrenovac
22nd Mixed Artillery Bngade Belgrade
150th Light Motonsed Bngade Lazarevac
22nd Mixed Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment Belgrade






51st Mechanized Bngade Pancevo
80th Motonsed Bngade Kraguievac
1 30th Motonsed Bngade Smederevska Palanka
1291h Light Motonsed Bngade Apatm
20th Light Infantry Bngade Pozarevac
21st Light Infantry Bngade Svetozarevo
24th Mixed Artillery Regiment/Bngade Smederevska Palanka
Special Forces Corps Belgrade
Motonsed Guards Bngade Belgrade
Motonsed Guards Bngade Belgrade
63rd Parachute Bngade Nis
72nd Special Forces Bngade Pancevo
Task Force Banat Zrenianin
14th Light Motonsed Bngade Kikinda
Task Force Dnna Loznica
544th Motonsed Bngade Sabac
208th Mixed Artillery Regiment Valjevo
310th SAM Regiment ->
149th SAM Regiment ->
240th SAM Regiment i
2nd (SER) Army Podgorica
Podgonca Corps Podgorica
5th Motonsed Bngade Podgonca
57th Motonsed Bngade Pljevlja
1 79th Motonsed Bngade Niksic
3rd Light Infantry/Light Motonsed Bngade Ivangrad
2nd Light Mountain Bngade Podgonca
4th Light Infantry Bngade Kolasin
326th Mixed Artillery Bngade Oanilovgrad
Uzice Corps Uzice
37th Motonsed Bngade Raska
168th Motonsed Bngade Novi Pazar
27th Light Motonsed Bngade Kraljevo
134th Light Infantry Bngade Uzice
6th Light Infantry Bngade Pnboj
7th Light Infantry Bngade Nova Varos
202nd Mixed Artillery Bngade Cacak










639 577 172 3.755 46.760 1,466 144 1.662
284 257 77 1.669 20.782 652 64 739
142 128 32
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4th Motonsed Brigade Pirot
2nd Motonsed Bngade Nis
211st Armored Bngade Nis
805th Motonsed Bngade Prokuplje
50th Light Infantry Bngade Aleksinac
21st Mixed Ano-Tank Bngade Leskovac
203rd Mixed Artillery Bngade Nis
Leskovac Corps Leskovac
89th Motonsed Bngade Vranie
135th Motonsed Bngade Surdulica
13th Light Motonsed Bngade Leskovac
42nd Mixed Ann-Tank Regiment/Bngade Vranie
Pnstina Corps Pnstina
243rd Armored Bngade Urosevac
15th Mechanized Bngade Pnstina
549th Motonsed Bngade Pnzren
58th Light Mechanized/Motonsed Bngade Leposavic
52nd Mixed Artillery Bngade Gniilane
102nd Mixed Anti-Tank Bngade Vranie
150tn Mixed Artillery Bngade Vranje
Task Force Timok Zajecar
148th Motonsed Bngade Negotin
9th Motonsed Bngade Zaiecar
23rd Light Infantry Bngade Bor
35th Light Infantry Bngade Negotin
31 1st SAM Regiment ?
Security & Paramilitary & Police Forces & MUP
Details about the Armv eouioment
Tanks 639
ARV. IFV 577
APC (w/0 AT) 172
AT 3.755
mcl Recoilless Rifles

















1.252 15 587 488
AD
554
[400 T-54/T-55. 239 M-84A. (181 T-34))
[30 BRDM-1. 30 BRDM-2. 517 BVP M-80A]
[112M-60P. 60BOV-1]
555 [30 Sagger BRDM-1. 10 Sagger BRDM-2. 60 Sagger BOV-1 130 M-87 TOPAZ (100-mm).
70 M-36B2(90-mm), 60 M-18 Hellcat)76-mm). 60 PAK-40(76-mm). 135 AT-3 Sagger]
3,200 [650 M-65(105-mm). 1000 M-60 PB(82-mm), 1550 M-18(57-mm)]
1.760 [60 M-48(76-mm). 1700 M-31/M-68(82-mm)]
45.000
666 [24 M-65(155-mm). 40 M-84B(152-mm). 25 D-20(152-mm). 48 M-1973f152-mm).
75 2S1(122-mm). 130 D-30J(122-mm) 150 M-1931/37(122-mm). 174 M-56(105-mm)]
240 [60 M-59(155-mm). 180 M-46(130-mm)]
560 [560 UB M-52&M-74/750 20-mm)]
[24 M-77/YMRL-32(128-mm). 48 M-85/M-63(128-mm). 72 RL M-71(128-mm)]
952 [8 BOV-30(twin 30-mm). 65 BOV-3(tnple 20-mm). 54 ZSU-57-2. 350 M-53(twin 30-mm).
475 M-55(tnple 20-mm))
710 [80 SA-6 Gainful, 500 SA-7 Grail. 130 SA-9 Gaskin]
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ANNEX C: OPPOSING FORCES, SCORES, AND MULTIPLIERS
Assets 7 (GE) Panzerdivision vs 3rd (SER) Army (half strength):
Tanks ARV, IFV APC AT I nf Assets GunArty MLRS AH AD
GE 318 390 24 54 1440 156 24 18 72
SER 106 96 28 626 7943 244 24 277
Assets 1 (UK) Armored Division vs. 3rd (SER) Army (half strenqth):
GunArty MLRS AHTanks ARV, IFV APC AT I nf Assets AD
UK 300 306 240 24 1224 120 18 24 36
SER 107 96 29 626 7944 244 24 277
Assets 1st (US) Infantry Division (MECH) vs. 2nd (SER) Army (half:strenqth):
MLRS AHTanks ARV, IFV APC AT I nf Assets GunArty AD
US 247 215 16 726 114 18 48 44
SER 71 64 19 417 5195 163 16 184
Assets 2nd (FR) Armored Division vs. 2nd (SER) Army (half strenqth):
MLRS AHTanks ARV, IFV APC AT I nf Assets GunArty AD
FR 174 76 96 42 985 42 24 18 72
SER 71 64 19 419 5196 163 16 185
Scores:
Tanks ARV, IFV APC AT I nf Assets GunArty MLRS AH AD
GE 7.5 3.5 1 1.2 0.3 5 10 3.5 1.5
UK 7.5 3.5 1 1.2 0.3 5 10 3.5 1.5
US 7.5 35 1 1.2 0.3 5 10 10 1.5
FR 7.5 3.5 1 1.2 0.3 5 10 3.5 1.5








Tanks ARV, IFV APC AT I nf Assets GunArty MLRS AH AD
GE 0.76 0.76 0.532 0.758 1.216 0.76 0.76 0.758 0.76
UK 0.76 0.76 0.532 0.758 1.216 0.76 0.76 0.758 0.76
US 0.76 0.76 0.532 0.758 1.216 0.76 0.76 0.758 0.76
FR 076 0.76 0.532 0.758 1.216 0.76 0.76 0.758 0.76
SER 0.88 0.88 0.616 2.08 2.08 0.88 0.88 1.092 0.88
Shortaqe Multipliers:
Tanks ARV, IFV APC AT I nf Assets GunArty MLRS AH AD
GE 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.6
UK 08 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.6
US 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.6
FR 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.6
SER 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.6
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trigger files = triggerl . trg, tables. trg, red2army . trg,
red3army . trg, redlarmy . trg, partisanmontenegro . trg,
nato. trg;






sensor files = sensorpartisanmontenegro. sen,
NATO. sen, RED. sen;
output control files = targetssensoredbypzbrig9 . ctl
;
//coordinate system and map definition
time per turn = 5MINUTES;
maps = balkan (C: \GCAM\Kosovo\map3 .bmp, 0, 0, 622.22,737.04),





larmy (C:\GCAM\Kosovo\KosovoSprites\larmy .bmp, 4, 25, 25, 1,
FALSE)
,






















II, 18, 1, FALSE)
taskforcedrina (C : \GCAM\Kosovo\KosovoSprites\taskforcedrina .bmp,





4, 13, 19, 1, FALSE)
2army (C:\GCAM\Kosovo\KosovoSprites\2army.bmp, 4, 25, 26, 1,
FALSE)
podgoricacorps (C: \GCAM\Kosovo\KosovoSprites\podgoricacorps .bmp,
4, 13, 21, 1, FALSE)
uzicecorps (C : \GCAM\Kosovo\KosovoSprites\uzicecorps .bmp, 4, 13,
21, 1, FALSE)
,
202artybrig (C: \GCAM\Kosovo\KosovoSprites\202artybrig.bmp, 4, 24,
17, 1, FALSE)
,
3army (C:\GCAM\Kosovo\KosovoSprites\3army.bmp, 4, 25, 25, 1,
FALSE)
,
niscorps (C: \GCAM\Kosovo\KosovoSprites\niscorps .bmp, 4, 13, 21, 1,
FALSE)
leskovaccorps (C: \GCAM\Kosovo\KosovoSprites\leskovaccorps .bmp, 4
,
13, 21, 1, FALSE)
,
pristinacorps (C: \GCAM\Kosovo\KosovoSprites\pristinacorps .bmp, 4
13, 21, 1, FALSE)
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150artybrig (C: \GCAM\Kosovo\KosovoSprites\150artybrig.bmp, 4, 24,
17, 1, FALSE)
,
taskforcetimok (C : \GCAM\Kosovo\KosovoSprites\taskforcetiinok.bmp,
4, 13, 19, 1, FALSE)
,
usdiv (C: \GCAM\Kosovo\KosovoSprites\usdiv.bmp, 4, 12, 17, 1,
FALSE)
,




\GCAM\Kosovo\KosovoSprites\gepzbrig9 .bmp, 4, 18, 14,
I, FALSE)
,
gepzgrenbrigl (C: \GCAM\Kosovo\KosovoSprites\gepzgrenbrigl .bmp, 4
,







18, 14, 1, FALSE)
ukdiv (C: \GCAM\Kosovo\KosovoSprites\ukdiv.bmp, 4, 12, 17, 1,
FALSE)





o.bmp, 4, 16, 14, 1, FALSE);
//unit report display control
unit classification hierarchy = environment, size, branch;
force membership hierarchy = player;
//GAME window display control
initial workspace = InitialWorkspace .wsp;





number of simulations = 1;
evaluation order = EXPLICIT ORDERS GENERATION, FORCE MEMBERSHIP,
SENSOR MANAGEMENT, REPORTING CHAIN CHANGES, CONTACT
LIST GENERATION, QUEUE MANIPULATIONS, MOTION,
POSTURE, DAMAGE AND REPAIR, INVENTORY MANIPULATIONS;
//registered inventory class specifications
registered inventory classes = Tk, IFV, RV, Mrt , Arty, AT, AAA,
SAM, SmAl, SmA2, Trucks, Troops;




-statistic 1km = 1;
// maps = map3 (C:\GCAM\Kosovo\map3 .bmp, 0, 0, 622.22,737.04);
-statistic lhr = 12;
// time per turn = 5 MINUTES;
-statistic 90min = 1.5 * lhr;
-statistic 2hrs = 2 * lhr;
-statistic 3hrs = 3 * lhr;
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statistic 3.5hrs = 3.5 * lhr;
statistic 4hrs = 4 * lhr;
statistic 5hrs = 5 * lhr;
statistic 6hrs = 6 * lhr;
statistic 12hrs = 12 * lhr
statistic 17hrs = 17 * lhr
statistic 24hrs = 24 * lhr
statistic 30hrs = 30 * lhr
statistic 32hrs = 32 * lhr
statistic 36hrs = 36 * lhr
statistic 72hrs = 72 * lhr
statistic lday = 24 * lhr;
statistic 2days = 2 * lday;
statistic 3.5days = 3.5 * lday;
statistic 13days = 13 * lday;
statistic 14days = 14 * lday;
statistic 16days = 16 * lday;
statistic 18.75days = 18.75 * lday;
statistic 2 8days = 28 * lday;
statistic hOOOO = * lhr;
statistic h0030 = 0.5 * lhr;
statistic h0600 = 6 * lhr;
statistic h2330 = 23.5 * lhr;
statistic dOO = * lday;
statistic dOl = 1 * lday;
statistic d04 = 4 * lday;
statistic dl5 = 15 * lday;
statistic d00h0030 = dOO + h0030;
statistic d01h0030 = dOl + h0030
statistic d01h0600 = dOl + h0600
statistic d04h0000 = d04 + hOOOO
statistic dl5h0000 = dl5 + hOOOO
statistic lkmh = 1km/ lhr;
statistic 2kmh = 2 * lkmh;
statistic 3kmh = 3 * lkmh;
statistic 5kmh = 5 * lkmh;
statistic lOkmh = 10*lkmh;
statistic 15kmh = 15*lkmh;
statistic 2 0kmh = 20*lkmh;
statistic 2 5kmh = 25*lkmh;
statistic 4 0kmh = 40*lkmh;
#END
#TRIGGERS
statistic currentturn = global, ONTURN;
condition cEndSim =currentturn =10000;
trigger EndSim = cEndSim;
-trigger Always = [global, ONTURN > -1]
-trigger Never = ! Always;
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•trigger DayTimeStarts = [global, PERIODIC (24hrs, 5hrs) = 1]
;























withdrawel2army = global, VECTOR (300























































= global, VECTOR (342 .5,463 .9,
334.5,413.7, 337.9,398.8,






statistic withdrawel3army = global, VECTOR (512 . 6 , 409 . 1,
504.6,422.8, 498.9,434.2, 486.4,441.1, 476.1,447.9,
471.5,463 .9)
statistic withdrawelleskovaccorps = global, VECTOR (527 . 5 , 374 . 8
,
529.7,362.2, 535.5,350.8, 532.0,337.1, 524.0,328.0,
520 .6, 320.0)
statistic withdrawelniscorps = global, VECTOR (488 . 6, 394 . 2
,
496.6,402.2)
statistic withdrawelpristinacorps = global, VECTOR (453 . 3 , 331 .4
446.4,323.4, 447.5,313.1);
statistic withdrawell50artybrig = global, VECTOR (529 . 7 , 324 . 5
,
534.3.336.0, 536.6,349.7, 535.5,362.2, 527.5,371.4,
519.5,387.4) ;
statistic withdraweltaskforcetimok = global, VECTOR (414 . 4 , 277 . 7
,
424.7.289.1, 429.3,297.1, 440.7,308.5, 447.5,322.2,
454.4.330.2, 465.8,342.8, 479.5,345.1, 486.4,354.2,









































withdrawellarmy = global, VECTOR (393 . 9, 572 . 5
,
.9,563.4, 395.0,551.9, 400.7,543.9, 409.9,533.6);
withdrawelmechcorps = global, VECTOR (399 . 6 , 606 . 8,
.2,594.2, 412.1,583.9, 412.1,571.3, 422.4,563.4,
,6,555.4, 44 0.7, 542 .8)
;
withdrawelnovisadcorps = global, VECTOR (345 . 9, 619 . 3
,
.9,626.2, 357.3,639.9, 347.1,647.9, 333.4,654.8);
withdrawelkragujevaccorps = global, VECTOR (430 . 4 , 482 . 2
,
.3,495.9, 421.3,507.4, 403.0,505.1, 38"8 . 2 , 507 . 4 ,
.2,515.4, 363.1,525.6, 369.9,534.8);
withdrawelsfcorps = global, VECTOR (359 . 6 , 561 . 1,




































withdrawelhqdivbelgrade = global, VECTOR (425 . 8 , 567 . 9,
4,569.1, 406.4,575.9, 393.9,573.6);
withdraweltaskforcebanat = global, VECTOR (387 . , 644 . 5
,
9,637.6, 387.0,623.9, 387.0,607.9, 389.3,593.1,
3,579.3, 371.0,578.2, 361.9,586.2, 349.4,595.3,
1,601.1, 327.7,596.5)




statistic montenegro = global
,
VECTOR (24 9, 306.2, 238 6,
247 7, 330 2, 246 6, 341.7, 240.9,350 8, 242 358 8,
240 9 369 1, 254 6,367.9, 256.9,379 4, 261 4 389 7,
266 0, 398 8, 272 9,401.1, 280.9,389 7, 288 8 398 8,
291 1, 406 8, 288 8,413.7, 282.0,425 1, 290 422 8,
299 1, 413 7, 308 3,407.9, 316.2,399 9, 322 o 390 8,
329 9 386 2, 340 2,378.2, 349.4,374 8, 359 6 372 5,
367 6 365 7, 372 2,361.1, 381.3,358 8, 385 9 354 2,
376 8 350 8, 375 6, 345.1, 367.6,348 5, 360 8 342 8,
358 5 332 5, 363 1,329.1, 356.2,322 2, 349 4 320 0,
345 9 330 2, 333 4, 334.8, 325.4,328 0, 319 .7 317 7,
314 306 2, 308 .3,298.2, 302 .5,290 2, 299 • 1 281 1,
301 4 272 0, 306 .0,265.1, 302.5,249 • 1, 286 .6 262 .8,

























































VECTOR (599. 4, 120.0, 586.8,123.4,
575.4,164.5, 574.3,178.3,
544.6,204.5, 533.2,213.7,
VECTOR (508. 1,230. 8, 502.3,242.3,
496.6,260.5, 504.6,266.2,










VECTOR (276. 3, 288.0, 284.3,299.4,
308.3.324.5, 314.0,333.7,
VECTOR (322 .0,344 .0, 326.5,352.0,
VECTOR (319. 7, 185 .1, 329.9,189.7,
334.5,228.5, 331.1,241.1,





















-^statistic randomOtol = global, NORMRAND;
#END
#TRIGGERS
-$trigger AllBlueDivReadyForAttack = [unit-countsreadiness,
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QPOP (BlueUnitsReadyForAttack) = 4] & [unit-countsreadiness
,
QPOP(BlueUnitsReadyForAttack) < 4, 1-2];
#END
#TRIGGERS
statistic attackgepzbrig9objl = global, VECTOR (501 . 6 , 280 . 6
,
501.6.284.1, 501.6,288.1, 501.9,292.2, 502.5,296.2,
503.4,300.9, 503.1,305.0, 503.7,309.0, 505.0,311.5,
508.1,314.3, 511.2,317.1, 514.1,320.0, 517.5,321.5,
518.8,324.6, 516.6,327.8);
statistic attackgepzgrenbriglobjl = global, VECTOR (513 . 7 , 28S . 1
,
512.5.291.2, 514.4,295.0, 517.5,297.8, 516.9,301.9,
517.5,306.2, 516.2,310.6, 513.7,314.3, 511.6,316.8,
513.7,319.0, 517.2,320.9, 520.6,323.7, 523.1,326.2);
#END
#TRIGGERS
statistic attackboundarypzbrig9 = global, VECTOR (492 . 8 , 290 . 6.
491.9,297.2, 493.4,301.9, 497.2,304.0, 498.4,309.0,
498.7,313.7, 500.9,317.1, 504.1,321.5, 506.9,325.3,
509.4.329.0, 514.4,329.3, 521.3,329.0, 522.2,321.5,































-trigger AllUnitsPodgoricaCorpsArrived = [unit-podgoricacorps





















-trigger AllUnitsTaskForceTimokArrived = [unit-taskforcetimok,









-trigger AllUnitsNisCorpsArrived = [unit-niscorps , POS =
(496.6,402 .2) , 24hrs] ;
#END
#TRIGGERS
trigger AllUnitsLeskovacCorpsArrived = [unit-leskovaccorps , POS
= (520 .6, 320 .0) , 24hrs] ;
#END
#TRIGGERS
trigger AllUnitsPristinaCorpsArrived = [unit-pristinacorps , POS








-trigger AllUnitsMechCorpsArrived = [unit-mechcorps, POS




-trigger AllUnitsNoviSadCorpsArrived = [unit-novisadcorps, POS =
(333 .4,654 . 8) , 24hrs] ;
#END
#TRIGGERS
trigger AllUnitsKragujevacCorpsArrived = [unit-kragujevaccorps




-trigger AllUnitsHQDivBelgradeArrived = [unit-hqdivbelgrade , POS




-trigger AllUnitsTaskForceDrinaArrived = [unit-taskforcedrina,
POS = (295.7,671.9), 30hrs];
#END
#TRIGGERS
•trigger AllUnitsTaskForceBanatArrived = [unit-taskforcebanat
,
POS = (327.7,596.5), 3 0hrs]
#END
#TRIGGERS






-statistic blueid = unit-partisanmontenegro, CONTACT ID;
-trigger PartisanDead = [unit-partisanmontenegro,
INVENTORY (Troops) = 0]
;
-trigger PartisanAcquiresTarget = [blueid != 0] & [randomOtol <
0.75] ;
-trigger PartisanEndsFight = [unit-partisanmontenegro,
ORDERS (combat) =1, 4hrs]
;
-statistic decreaseinventoryclasspartisanmontenegro = global,
VECTOR(6, 9, 10, 11, 12);
-statistic decreaseinventorynumberpartisanmontenegro = global,
VECTOR (-1, -2, -1, -1, -2) ;
#END
#TRIGGERS
-trigger BlueForcesArrive = [global, ONTURN = 24hrs]
;
-trigger TaskForwardDeployment = [global, ONTURN = 18.75days];
-trigger MapChange = [unit-countsreadiness,
QPOP (BlueUnitsReadyForAttack) = 4] & [unit-countsreadiness
,
QPOP(BlueUnitsReadyForAttack) < 4, 1-2];




trigger AllUnitsGEDivArrived = [unit-gediv, POS = (600, 124),
13 days]
;
trigger FFGEDeployment = [unit-gediv, POS = (508.1,230.8)];
trigger GEDivPreparation = [unit-gediv, POS = (505.8,275.4)];
•trigger GEDivReady = [unit-gediv, POS = (505.8,275.4), 72hrs]
#END
#TRIGGERS
trigger AllUnitsUKDivArrived = [unit-ukdiv, POS = (575, 105),
14days]
-trigger FFUKDeployment = [unit-ukdiv, POS = (508.1,230.8)];
-trigger UKDivPreparation = [unit-ukdiv, POS = (443.0,258.2)];






-trigger USForcesArrive = ! [unit-2army, INPOLY (montenegro) =
1] & ! [unit-podgoricacorps , INPOLY (montenegro) = 1] &
! [unit-uzicecorps, INPOLY (montenegro) = 1]&! [unit-
202artybrig, INPOLY (montenegro) = 1]
;
-trigger AllUnitsUSDivArrived = [unit-usdiv, POS = (277, 284),
13 days]
;
-trigger FFUSDeployment = [unit-usdiv, POS = (322.0,344.0)];
-trigger USDivPreparation = [unit-usdiv, POS = (331.1,361.1)];
-trigger USDivReady = [unit-usdiv, INVENTORY (Readiness) >=
72hrs]
;
-trigger USDivFightsBack = [unit-partisanmontenegro,
ORDERS (combat) = 1] ;
-trigger USReturnToForwardDeploymentl = ( [unit-
partisanmontenegro, ORDERS (combat) != 1] | [unit-
partisanmontenegro, ORDERS (dead) = 1] )& [unit-usdiv,
STATUS (GSC1) = 1]
;
-trigger USReturnToForwardDeployment2 = ( [unit-
partisanmontenegro, ORDERS (combat) != 1] | [unit-
partisanmontenegro, ORDERS (dead) = 1] )& [unit-usdiv,
STATUS (GSC2) = 1]
-trigger USReturnToPreparation = ( [unit-partisanmontenegro,
ORDERS (combat) != 1] | [unit-partisanmontenegro, ORDERS (dead)
= 1] )& [unit-usdiv, STATUS(GSC3) = 1]
-trigger USReturnToReadiness = ( [unit-partisanmontenegro,
ORDERS (combat) != 1] | [unit-partisanmontenegro, ORDERS (dead)
= 1] )& [unit-usdiv, STATUS (GSC4) = 1] ;
-statistic decreaseinventoryclassusdivattackbypartisan = global,
VECTOR (9, 10, 12) ;
-statistic decreaseinventorynumberusdivattackbypartisan = global,
VECTOR(-5, -1, -1)
;
-trigger AttackByPartisan = [unit-partisanmontenegro, CONTACT ID
= 3000] & [unit-partisanmontenegro, ORDERS (combat) = 1] ;
-trigger USDivInReadinessPhase = [unit-usdiv,
ORDERS (usdivpreparation) = 1]
;
#TRIGGERS
-trigger AllUnitsFRDivArrived = [unit-frdiv, POS = (322, 187),
16days]
-trigger FFFRDeployment = [unit-frdiv, POS = (323.1,262.8)];
-trigger FRDivPreparation = [unit-frdiv, POS = (381.3,277.7)],-




-trigger GEDivReadyForAttack = [unit-gediv,
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ORDERS (gedivopsreadiness) = 1, 3hrs] & [unit-gediv,
ORDERS (gedivopsreadiness) != 1, 1- [3hrs + 1] ] ;
-trigger USDivReadyForAttack = [unit-usdiv,
ORDERS (usdivopsreadiness) = 1, 3hrs] & [unit-usdiv,
ORDERS (usdivopsreadiness) != 1, 1- [3hrs + 1] ] ;
-trigger UKDivReadyForAttack = [unit-ukdiv,
ORDERS (ukdivopsreadiness) = 1, 3hrs] & [unit-ukdiv,
ORDERS (ukdivopsreadiness) != 1, l-[3hrs + 1] ]
;
-trigger FRDivReadyForAttack = [unit-f rdiv,
ORDERS (frdivopsreadiness) = 1, 3hrs] & [unit-f rdiv,
ORDERS (frdivopsreadiness) ! = 1, 1- [3hrs + 1] ] ;
-statistic gedividnumber = unit-gediv, ID;
-statistic usdividnumber = unit-usdiv, ID;
-statistic ukdividnumber = unit-ukdiv, ID;
-statistic frdividnumber = unit-frdiv, ID;
#END
#TRIGGERS
-trigger TargetSensored = [unit-gepzbrig9, CONTACT ID != 0]
;
-statistic unitsensoredbypzbrig9 = unit-gepzbrig9, CONTACT ID;
-statistic engagedtarget = unit-gepzbrig9, QLOOKH (TargetContact)
;
-trigger TargetBeyondBoundary = [unit -engagedtarget
,
INPOLY(attackboundarypzbrig9) = 0] ,-




-trigger AllWeaponsInFiringRange = [distancepzbrig9totarget <=
[global, VECTORCOMPONENT(mainfiringrange, 7)]];
-statistic speedtargetpzbrig9 = unit-engagedtarget , SPEED;
-statistic distancelastturn = unit-gepzbrig9,
QLOOKH (DistanceToTargets)
;
-trigger RedStartsDelay = [speedtargetpzbrig9 > 0] &
[distancepzbrig9totarget > distancelastturn]
;
-statistic redsurrenderthreshold = 0.3;
-statistic percentagetkred = [unit-engagedtarget,
INVENTORY (Tk) ] / [unit-engagedtarget, INVENTORYCAP (Tk) ]
-statistic percentageifvred = [unit-engagedtarget,
INVENTORY ( I FV) ] / [unit-engagedtarget, INVENTORYCAP (I FV) ]
;
-statistic percentageartyred = [unit-engagedtarget,
INVENTORY (Arty) ] / [unit-engagedtarget , INVENTORYCAP (Arty) ]
;
-trigger RedSurrenders = ( [percentagetkred < redsurrender
threshold] & [percentageartyred < redsurrenderthreshold]
)
( [percentageifvred < redsurrenderthreshold]
& [percentageartyred < redsurrenderthreshold] )
;
-statistic percentagetkpzbrig9 = [unit-gepzbrig9,
INVENTORY (Tk) ] / [unit-gepzbrig9 , INVENTORYCAP (Tk) ]
;
-statistic percentageifvpzbrig9 = [unit-gepzbrig9,
INVENTORY ( I FV) ] / [unit -gepzbrig9 , INVENTORYCAP (I FV) ]
;
-statistic percentageartypzbrig9 = [unit-gepzbrig9,
INVENTORY (Arty) ] / [unit-gepzbrig9, INVENTORYCAP (Arty) ]
;
-statistic pzbrig9thresholdl = 0.8;
-trigger PzBrig9UnderThresholdl = ( [percentagetkpzbrig9 <
pzbrig9thresholdl] & [percentageartypzbrig9 <
pzbrig9thresholdl] ) | ( [percentageifvpzbrig9 <
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pzbrig9thresholdl] & [percentageartypzbrig9 <
pzbrig9thresholdl] )
;
-statistic pzbrig9threshold2 = 0.7;
-trigger PzBrig9UnderThreshold2 = ( [percentagetkpzbrig9 <
pzbrig9threshold2] & [percentageartypzbrig9 <
pzbrig9threshold2] ) | ( [percentageifvpzbrig9 <
pzbrig9threshold2] & [percentageartypzbrig9 <
pzbrig9threshold2] )
-statistic pzbrig9threshold3 = 0.6;
-trigger PzBrig9UnderThreshold3 = ( [percentagetkpzbrig9 <
pzbrig9threshold3] & [percentageartypzbrig9 <
pzbrig9threshold3] ) | ( [percentageifvpzbrig9 <
pzbrig9threshold3] & [percentageartypzbrig9 <
pzbrig9threshold3] )
-statistic minimumf iringrange = global, VECTOR
COMPONENT (mainf iringrange, 2);
-trigger PzBrig9BeyondBoundaries = [unit-gepzbrig9,
INPOLY(attackboundarypzbrig9) = 0]
;
-trigger PzBrig9GetsReserves = PzBrig9UnderThreshold3
(PzBrig9UnderThreshold2 & [randomOtol < 0.5]);
-trigger PzBrig9GetsNoReserves = ! PzBrig9GetsReserves
;
-statistic locationofpzbrig9 = unit-gepzbrig9, POS
;
-statistic backtowherepathlef t = unit-gepzbrig9,
QUEUEH( Posit ionWhenTargetSensored: 2)
;
-statistic speedpzbrig9 = unit-gepzbrig9 , SPEED;
-trigger PzBrig9Defends =PzBrig9UnderThreshold3 & [speedpzbrig9 >
0] ;
-trigger DetermineDistanceToTarget = [unit-gepzbrig9
,
ORDERS (approachtargetandstartf iring) = 1]
[unit-gepzbrig9, ORDERS (allweapons firing) = 1] ;
-trigger DetermineLocationOfPzBrig9 = TargetSensored & [unit-
gepzbrig9, ORDERS (gepzbrig9attacksobj 1) = 1]
;
//once only





X0 = 3 93;
y0 = 571;
display style = SPRITE;
sprite = larmy;
classification = land, army, hq;
force membership = RED;
orders = start {nochange, 0, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
AllUnits3ArmyArrived-withdrawel }
,
withdrawel{ nochange, 1, CONTINUOUSPATH, 2 0kmh, OPEN,
withdrawellarmy ? AllUnitslArmyArrived-
defensepreparation} , defensepreparationj nochange, 0,







xO = 4 05;
yO = 605;
display style = SPRITE;
sprite = mechcorps;
classification = land, army, corps;
force membership = RED;
orders = start {nochange, 0, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
AllUnitslArmyArrived-withdrawel } ,
withdrawel{ nochange, 1, CONTINUOUS PATH, 2 0kmh, OPEN,
withdrawelmechcorps ?AllUnit sMechCorpsArrived
-
defensepreparation} , defensepreparation{nochange, 0,





xO = 34 6;
yO = 619;
display style = SPRITE;
sprite = novisadcorps;
classification = land, army
force membership = RED;
orders = start {nochange,
corps
0, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
AllUnitslArmyArrived-withdrawel}
,











xO = 4 32;
yO =4 82;
display style = SPRITE;
sprite = kragujevaccorps;
classification = land, army
force membership = RED;
orders = start {nochange,
corps
0, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
AllUnitslArmyArrived-withdrawel }
,














label = sf corps;
xO = 3 60;
y0 = 562;
display style = SPRITE;
sprite = sfcorps;
classification = land, army, corps;
force membership = RED;
orders = start {nochange, 0, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
BlueForcesArrive-withdrawel }
,








X0 = 42 8;
y0 = 570;
display style = SPRITE;
sprite = hqdivbelgrade;
classification = land, army, division;
force membership = RED;
orders = start {nochange, 0, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
AllUnitsMechCorpsArrived-withdrawel }
,











display style = SPRITE;
sprite = taskforcedrina;
classification = land, army, division;
force membership = RED;
orders = start {nochange, 0, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
AllUnitsMechCorpsArrived-withdrawel}
,











xO = 3 87;
yO = 63 9;
display style = SPRITE;
sprite = taskforcebanat
;
classification = land, army, division;
force membership = RED;
orders = start {nochange, 0, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
AllUnitsHQDivBelgradeArrived-withdrawel }
,










X0 = 3 00;
yO = 3 08;
display style = SPRITE;
sprite = 2army;
classification = land, army, hq;
force membership = RED;
orders = start {nochange, 0, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
BlueForcesArrive-withdrawel }
,












xO = 2 67;
yO = 2 96;
display style = SPRITE;
sprite = podgoricacorps;
classification = land, army,
force membership = RED;
orders = start {nochange,
corps;
0, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
Al lUni t s 2ArmyArr ived - wi thdrawe 1 }
,












xO = 34 6;
yO = 465;
display style = SPRITE;
sprite = uzicecorps;
classification = land, army, corps;
force membership = RED;
orders = start {nochange, 0, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
FirstUnits2ArmyArrived-withdrawel }
,








label = 2 02artybrig;
xO = 3 04;
yO = 388;
display style = SPRITE;
sprite = 202artybrig;
classification land, army
force membership = RED;



















yO = 4 9;
display style = SPRITE;
sprite = 3 army;
classification = land, army, hq;
force membership = RED;
sensor vulnerabilities = bluedaytimesensorforredforces,
bluenighttimesensor forredforces;
orders = start {nochange, 0, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
AllUnits2ArmyArrived-withdrawel}
,









xO = 4 90;
yO = 375;
display style = SPRITE;
sprite = niscorps;
classification = land, army, corps;
force membership = RED;
sensor vulnerabilities = bluedaytimesensorforredf orces,
bluenighttimesensor forredforces
;
orders = start {nochange, 0, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
AllUnitsl50ArtyBrigArrived-withdrawel }
,














display style = SPRITE;
sprite = leskovaccorps;
classification = land, army, corps;
force membership = RED;
sensor vulnerabilities = bluedaytimesensorforredforces,
bluenighttimesensor forredforces
;
orders = start {nochange, 0, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
AllUnitsl50ArtyBrigArrived-withdrawel}
,










xO = 4 54;
y0 = 331;
display style = SPRITE;
sprite = pristinacorps;
classification = land, army, corps;
force membership = RED;
sensor vulnerabilities = bluedaytimesensorforredforces
,
bluenighttimesensor forredforces
orders = start {nochange, 0, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
AllUnitsl50ArtyBrigArrived-withdrawel }
,
withdrawel {nochange, 1, CONTINUOUSPATH, 20kmh, OPEN,
withdrawelpristinacorps ?
Al lUnits PristinacorpsArrived -de fensepreparation}
,






xO = 52 8;
y0 = 324;
display style = SPRITE;
sprite = 150artybrig;
classification = land, army, brig;
100
force membership = RED;
sensor vulnerabilities = bluedaytimesensorforredforces,
bluenighttimesensor forredforces
;
orders = start {nochange, 0, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
AllUnitsTaskForceTimokArrived-withdrawel }
,












yO = 2 81;
display style = SPRITE;
sprite = taskforcetimok;
classification = land, army, division;
force membership = RED;
sensor vulnerabilities = bluedaytimesensorforredforces,
bluenighttimesensorforredforces ,-
orders = start {nochange, 0, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
AllUnits3ArmyArrived-withdrawel }
,









label = partisanmontenegro ,-
xO = 3 06;
yO = 371;
display style = SPRITE;
sprite = partisanmontenegro;
classification = land, army, troops;
force membership = RED;
sensors = PartisanDetectsBlue;
orders = start {nochange, 3, RANDOM POLYGONAL CONFINEMENT,
lOkmh, 30, partisanareamontenegro ?
PartisanDead-dead, PartisanAcquiresTarget -combat}
,
dead {DEAD INVISIBLE, 2, DEFAULT, 0, 0},
combat {nochange, 1, FOLLOW, 40kmh, blueid, 180, 1 ?
101
Part isanDead- dead, Part isanEndsFight- start
}
-start;
inventory classes = AT, SmAl , SmA2 , Trucks, Troops;
initial inventory = 1, 5, 2, 1, 8
;
inventory capacities =1, 5, 2, 1, 8
;










display style = SPRITE;
sprite = gediv;
classification = land, army
force membership = BLUE;
orders = start {nochange,
div;
3, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
BlueForcesArrive-geforcesarrive}
,







geforwarddeploymentl{ nochange, 0, CONTINUOUSPATH,
15kmh, OPEN, marchlgediv ?
FFGEDeployment-geforwarddeployment2 }
,
geforwarddeployment2 {nochange, 0, CONTINUOUSPATH,
lOkmh, OPEN, march2gediv ?
GEDivPreparation-gedivpreparation}
,
gedivpreparationj nochange, 1, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
GEDivReady-gedivopsreadiness}
,
gedivopsreadiness{ nochange, 0, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
MapChange-mapchange}
,







display style = SPRITE;
sprite = gepzbrig9;
classification = land, army, brig,









sensor vulnerabilities = reddaytimesensorforblueforces,
rednighttimesensorforblueforces
;
orders = start {nochange, 3, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
MapChange-mapchange}
,
mapchange{ nochange, 0, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
TaskGroundForceAttack-gepzbrig9attacksobj l}
,
gepzbrig9attacksobjl {nochange, 0, CONTINUOUSPATH,
5kmh, OPEN, attackgepzbrig9obj 1 ?
TargetSensored-approachtargetandstartfiring}
,




RedStart sDe lay- follow,
Al 1Weapons InFiringRange- allweapons firing}
allweaponsf iringjnochange, 1, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
RedStart sDel ay- follow,




//order ! PzBrig9UnderThreshold2 -pzbrig9delay
PzBrig9UnderThresholdl-pzbrig9requestforreserves }
,
follow{nochange, 1, FOLLOW, 5kmh, engagedtarget , 180,
minimumf iringrange ?
PzBrig9BeyondBoundaries -gepzbrig9attacksobj 1 }
,








pzbrig9defense {nochange, 1, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, 0},
-start;
queue names = TargetContact , DistanceToTargets
,
PositionWhenTargetSensored;
queue initial states =TargetContact (0) , DistanceToTargets (0)
,
PositionWhenTargetSensored (0 , 0)
;








DetermineLocationOf PzBrig9 (PUSHH ( Posit ionWhenTargetSe








display style = SPRITE;
sprite = gepzgrenbrigl
;
classification land, army, brig;
force membership = BLUE;







sensor vulnerabilities = reddaytimesensorforblueforces,
rednighttimesensorforblueforces
;
orders = start {nochange, 3, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
MapChange-mapchange}
,
mapchange{ nochange, 0, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
TaskGroundForceAttack-gepzgrenbriglattacksobj 1 }
,
gepzgrenbriglattacksobjl {nochange, 0, CONTINUOUSPATH,









display style = SPRITE;
sprite = gepzgrenbrig7
classification = land, army, brig;












orders = start {nochange, 3, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
MapChange-mapchange}
,









display style = SPRITE;
sprite = ukdiv;
classification = land, army, div,
104
force membership = BLUE;
orders = start {nochange, 3, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
BlueForcesArrive-ukforcesarrive }
,








ukforwarddeploymentl{ nochange, 0, CONTINUOUSPATH,
15kmh, OPEN, marchlukdiv ?
FFUKDeployment -ukforwarddeployment2 }
,
ukforwarddeployment2 { nochange, 0, CONTINUOUS PATH,
lOkmh, OPEN, march2ukdiv ?
UKDivPreparation-ukdivpreparation}
,
ukdivpreparation{ nochange, 1, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
UKDivReady-ukdivopsreadiness}
,








yO = 2 84;
display style = SPRITE;
sprite = usdiv;
classification = land, army, div;
force membership = BLUE;
sensor vulnerabilities = PartisanDetectsBlue ;
orders = start {nochange, 3, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
USForcesArrive-usforcesarrive}
,












us forwarddeployment2 {CLEAR GSC2 , 0, CONTINUOUS PATH,






















inventory classes = Tk, IFV, RV, Mrt, Arty, AT, AAA, SAM, SmAl,
SmA2 , Trucks, Troops, Readiness;
initial inventory = 246, 123, 24, 18, 84, 100, 24, 12, 10000,
3000, 1000, 15000, 0;
inventory capacities = 246, 123, 24, 18, 84, 100, 24, 12, 10000,
3000, 1000, 15000, 864;




USDivInReadinessPhase (none, Readiness, 1) ;
#END
#UNIT




display style = SPRITE;
sprite = frdiv;
classification = land, army, div;
force membership = BLUE;
orders = start {nochange, 3, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
BlueForcesArrive-f rforcesarrive}
,
frforcesarrive{ nochange, 1, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
AllUnitsFRDivArrived-forwarddeploymentpreparation}
,
forwarddeploymentpreparat ion {nochange , ,
STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
TaskForwardDeployment - f rforwarddeployment 1 }
,
frforwarddeploymentl {nochange, 0, CONTINUOUSPATH,
15kmh, OPEN, marchlfrdiv ?
FFFRDeployment - f rforwarddeployment2 } ,
frforwarddeployment 2 {nochange, 0, CONTINUOUSPATH,
lOkmh, OPEN, march2frdiv ?
FRDivPreparation-frdivpreparation}
,
frdivpreparation{nochange, 1, STRAIGHTLINE, 0, ?
FRDivReady-frdivopsreadiness}
,






display style = NEVERDISPLAY;
force membership = BLUE;
106
#END
queue names = BlueUnitsReadyForAttack;








USDivReadyForAttack (GROWH (BlueUnitsReadyForAttack : usdividnu
mber) )
UKDivReadyForAttack (GROWH (BlueUnitsReadyForAttack :ukdividnu
mber) )






polygon = -5.0,5.0, 5.0,5.0,







polygon = 0.0,24.0, -20.0,0.0, 0.0,-19.5, 20.0,0.0;





polygon = 0.0,24.0, -20.0,0.0, 0.0,-19.5, 20.0,0.0,





polygon = 0.0,4.5, -2.5,0.0, 0.0,-1.7, 2.5,0.0;






polygon = 0.0,3.0, -1.5,0.0, 0.0,-1.2, 1.5,0.0




filename = targetssensoredbypzbrig9 . out
;
control trigger = TargetSensored;
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